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Bernard Williams’s formulation of the Demandingness Objection holds that living a
moral life, as the consequentialist understands it, is incompatible with living a life that is
good for human beings. This is because the demands of consequentialist morality
threaten to overwhelm the life of the person who cares about being moral, thus leaving no
time for their own projects and interests. Several prominent consequentialists have
responded to the Demandingness Objection by seeking a more moderate and indirect
form of consequentialism that does not require as strong a duty of beneficence as
classical utilitarianism. I review and criticize three prominent moderate forms of
consequentialism: Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialism; the theories of Samuel Scheffler
and Tim Mulgan, which share an agent centered prerogative; and Liam Murphy’s
collective principle of beneficence. As the primary method of criticism, I develop a type
of collective action problem, which I refer to as the Polluter’s Dilemma. This dilemma
occurs when a moral theory permits agents to favor their own interests and in doing so
create a very small harm that affects all other agents. These small harms accumulate, and
the result is that the long-term interests of all agents are greatly harmed. I provide reasons
to think that acceptable forms of consequentialism must avoid the Polluter’s Dilemma,
and I argue that the three mentioned forms of moderate consequentialism do not avoid the
Polluter’s Dilemma. In concluding, I review a form of consequentialism that, I argue,

avoids both the Polluter’s Dilemma and the Demandingness Objection. Based on this
result, I make recommendations about how future consequentialist moral theories should
develop. Consequentialists should seek a moral theory that leaves agents room for their
own projects, but that theory should be flexible enough to recognize which stringent
demands are appropriate and which stringent demands are not, and the theory should not
support the aims of agents that leave everyone worse off in the long term.
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Introduction

Consequentialism – the view that an action’s moral permissibility depends solely on the
rankings of states of affairs on some evaluative scale – is widely viewed as a candidate
for the best general approach to doing ethics. Its most famous version – classical act
utilitarianism, the view that the rightness of an action depends solely upon the propensity
of that action to maximize happiness - has many attractive features. It is an impartial
theory; it asks that we treat the interests of all relevant parties equally and impartially, all
other things being equal. It is an inclusive theory; the moral community, or the class of
beings whose interests we are morally obligated to take into account, includes not only all
human beings within the bounds of the moral community, but all sentient beings. It is a
flexible theory; the central goal of act utilitarianism is to produce the best result possible,
but it may be paired with many different accounts of what this best possible result
consists in. Finally, it is a reformist theory of morality which recommends that we change
our ways, both at the collective and at the personal level, if a careful assessment of the
facts leads us to conclude that things could be done better. Historically, it has served as
the theoretical groundwork for many excellent causes. Women’s liberation and political
liberalism (John Stuart Mill), reform of the legal and penal code (Jeremy Bentham), and
animal liberation, environmentalism, and assistance to those living in extreme poverty
(Peter Singer) are but a few of the famous and worthy causes that adherents of act
utilitarianism have historically advocated. For all these reasons, and others, act
utilitarianism – and consequentialism more generally, even though the specific version of
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it being talked about may or may not share these features with act utilitarianism – has
many proponents. Indeed, several contemporary philosophers refer to the following
thought as the “Compelling Idea” that makes consequentialism such a perennially
attractive approach: it is always permissible for an agent to bring about the best possible
state of affairs.1
What many see as beneficial, however, others see as problematic. Both critics of
consequentialism and thoughtful consequentialists who are not utilitarians can and have
taken issue with all the items that I have listed as attractive features of consequentialism.2
I do not aim to focus on all of their criticisms in this dissertation. The focus of the present
work is the fourth item on my list; namely, that act utilitarianism is a moral theory with
reformist impulses. Although this feature of act utilitarianism lends itself to excellent
uses, it also lends itself to what has become a traditional objection to act utilitarianism.
Many philosophers have believed that act utilitarianism asks for far too much sacrifice
from us to be a plausible ethical theory. If the main goal of morality is to produce as
much good in the world as possible, then it appears that any action that is not somehow
maximizing the amount of good in the world would be judged as wrong.
This implication could seem intuitive in some cases. For example, a critic of a
particular government policy, such as the War on Drugs in the United States or the
practice of capital punishment, might argue on consequentialist grounds that her target
policy should be discontinued because it fails to maximize the good. But the traditional
1

Douglas Portmore (2005, 98) puts the thought this way: “what about [consequentialism] is so
compelling? Well, it seems to be the very simple and seductive idea that it can never be wrong to produce
the best available state of affairs.” See Schroeder 2006, 2007 and Dreier 2011 for more uses of this
terminology.
2
There is, to take one example into consideration, a lively debate over whether consequentialism must be
thought of as impartial and agent-neutral. What I think of as the standard view is that consequentialism
must be agent-neutral (see McNaughton and Rawling 1991 and Pettit 1997). Portmore 2001 and Broome
1991, by contrast, argue that consequentialism can incorporate agent relativity.
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form of consequentialism is not a theory of morality at the collective level only; it is also
meant to be a theory of morality at the individual level. Our own actions, or lack thereof,
also come in for judgment under this theory. If it turns out that our own actions are failing
to maximize the good, then we will turn out to be much less morally good than we might
have thought we were. If we, for example, have a choice between spending some amount
of our own money on personal entertainment, or spending that same amount of money on
an effective charity which would provide aid to someone living in dire poverty, it seems
intuitive to suppose that the greater amount of happiness would be generated by giving
this amount of money to charity. Though our own entertainment matters from the point of
view of act utilitarianism, we are not suffering much if we lose out on, for example, a
single trip to the movie theater. We cannot say the same of someone, to give two
examples, whose supply of food and fresh water is insecure, or who lives without access
to competent medical services. Our trip to the movies is the lesser good. We would not
be giving up much of moral importance if we donated our money to charity.
That might be enough to persuade a considerate and thoughtful person to give up
one such trip to the movie theater. But the same considerations apply for the next trip to
the movie theater, or the next impulse purchase, or the way we spend our free time, or the
careers we choose, and so forth. Indeed, the traditional objection to act utilitarianism to
which I alluded earlier has come to be known as the Demandingness Objection.
This objection, as I shall understand it for the purposes of this dissertation, holds
that any system worth calling a system of morality should be compatible with living a life
that is an enjoyable life for a human being to lead. The way a moral system achieves this
compatibility is to not overwhelm the life of the person who wants to be moral. The
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friend of the Demandingness Objection thinks that a good life for a human being includes
the freedom to choose interests and projects that matter to us and that make our lives
meaningful and enjoyable. Naturally, any system of morality worthy of its name will
sometimes impose demands on us. But the friend of the Demandingness Objection
believes that there is a significant difference between the number and scope of the
demands an acceptable moral theory may place on us and the number and scope of the
demands that a moral theory may place on us. Because there is so much good to be done
in the world, act utilitarianism requires us to scrutinize each of our actions and consider
how we might best work to generate the greatest good for all. The friend of the
Demandingness Objection believes that, in weighing what we ought to do, it will almost
always be the case that a person ought to work for the greater good, which she may not
identify with or care about, and forego working on his own projects and interests, which
are things that give her life meaning and enjoyment. This will hold for every decision a
person must make.
To drive the point home, Tim Mulgan describes a case in which a person who has
already contributed a significant sum of money to charity is once again faced with the
choice of buying expensive tickets to the theater or giving the money to an effective
charity. Suppose that this person chooses to buy the tickets. As Mulgan says, “the
Demandingness Objection says that Consequentialism must condemn Affluent’s
behavior, and that this [the condemnation] is unreasonable.”3 Thus, it appears, act
utilitarianism – and perhaps all theories which go under the heading of
‘consequentialism’ as well – is a highly demanding moral theory. It is demanding
3

Mulgan 2001, 4. The capitalization of “Consequentialism” is his, and Affluent is the name of the person
in the thought experiment.
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because it alienates agents from the projects and interests that make their lives
meaningful and enjoyable.
Consequentialists and non-consequentialists alike feel the pull of this Objection.
For non-consequentialists, one way of prodding the consequentialist on this matter is to
flesh out an unintuitive implication of the Objection. Non-consequentialists will
sometimes point out consequentialism does away with the possibility of supererogation.
No longer is there a certain class of actions which are morally praiseworthy for an agent
to perform but not morally required of that agent; no longer could we say that an agent
goes above and beyond the call of duty in doing morally praiseworthy actions when that
agent donates to charity, or so it seems. It would appear that something that we intuitively
felt was true - that there really are such things as supererogatory actions - cannot be the
case under consequentialism.4 Such an observation is what Peter Unger might label as a
“Preservationist” response. According to Unger, the Preservationist believes that our
reaction to particular cases accurately reflects our moral commitments, and this
appearance of an accurate reflection is trustworthy and ought to be preserved.5 In this
case, we commonly have the intuition that giving to charity is not morally required, and
one ought not to be criticized if one gives nothing to charity. Moreover, philosophers and
non-philosophers have the intuition that there are many kinds of actions which might
produce the most good, but which nevertheless are not morally required. That is
something the consequentialist may have to give up on, the non-consequentialist might
claim.
What are some responses to the Demandingness Objection that utilitarians, and
4

This is a standard enough way of fleshing out the Demandingness Objection that it is commonly taught at
the undergraduate level. See, for example, Shafer-Landau 2010, 132.
5
See Unger 1996, 11.
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consequentialists more broadly, have offered?
One possible response is to deny that there is a problem for consequentialism here.
Indeed, according to this response, we ought to think of this as a reason that
consequentialism might actually be the correct moral theory. Morality is, in fact, very
demanding. This is the response preferred by philosophers like Peter Singer, Shelly
Kagan, and Peter Unger.6
Another sort of response is to think of such demandingness as a real problem for
any form of consequentialism. Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that if there is anything
wrong with consequentialism, it is its propensity to demand so much sacrifice.7 What
form might a response from the consequentialist to this problem take?
One response of this type is to treat the phenomenon of demandingness as
stemming from a misunderstanding of how consequentialists ought to go about deciding
what to do. On this view, consequentialists distinguish between understanding
consequentialism as an objective standard of rightness and truth-maker for moral claims,
and consequentialism as a decision procedure that each agent ought to subjectively follow
when wondering about what to do. It would be a mistake if agents accepted a
commitment to regularly and directly evaluate acts in purely consequentialist terms.
Instead, one should be committed to leading the sort of life and doing the kinds of actions
which, if evaluated in consequentialist terms, would in fact make things go best for
everyone concerned. Peter Railton has proposed just such a response to the
Demandingness Objection.8 Railton argues that the fundamental notion that the
6

Singer 1972; Kagan 1989; Unger 1996.
Kagan 1989, xiii., describes such a claim.
8
Railton 1984, especially 152-153. To be more specific, Railton views the Demandingness Objection as
involving a phenomenon that he dubs alienation and he characterizes as a separation between the rational
7

7

consequentialist accepts is that the maximal amount of human value should be promoted.
The fundamental notion is not that the maximal amount of human value must be
promoted in a specific way. Thus, a sincere consequentialist may behave in such a way
that promotes the greatest good over the long run without being strictly committed to a
difficult kind of calculating and alienating decision procedure. It may even be practically
necessary for such a person to behave wrongly from an objective consequentialist point
of view, such as when a person chooses to spend the day relaxing with his or her partner,
rather than spending his or her day constructing homes for the homeless. However, the
wrongdoing may be a blameless kind of wrongdoing. The blamelessness of this act lies in
how the wrongdoing affects the agent. If the agent did not spend the day relaxing (on
occasion) with his or her partner, then the agent might ultimately be a more cynical
person. His or her capacity to bring about good in the world would be less-developed and
his or her overall contribution to well-being would be less in the end because of his or her
cynicism. So in order to ward off cynicism, consequentialism might recommend that the
committed consequentialist not behave subjectively as a consequentialist.
Plausible as Railton’s proposal may seem, it has not been universally adopted.
Several philosophers who self-identify as consequentialists or who hold views sharing
much in common with consequentialism treat the Demandingness Objection as indicative
of a deeply-rooted problem with consequentialism that only much modification can solve.
These philosophers think, with Railton, that morality ought to be compatible with
allowing us time and resources to pursue a wide variety of relationship commitments and

self that decides what to do based on the available reasons for acting and the affective self that is more
concerned with other-regarding relationships and an agent’s own sentiments. In what follows, I shall focus
less on the broader phenomenon that Railton describes, and instead limit my attention to the kind of
alienation that is specifically about being estranged from one’s projects and goals.
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non-moral projects that might matter to us. The project of being a good person ought not
to take over our lives (though it should certainly be an important project in our lives).9
But Railton and these philosophers part ways over the issue of whether consequentialism
has the theoretical resources to preserve our projects, relationships, and personal
integrity. Railton believes that consequentialism, properly understood, has such
resources. The philosophers I allude to here – Samuel Scheffler, Tim Mulgan, Brad
Hooker, and Liam Murphy – feel that consequentialism requires extensive modification
in order to be a moral theory that can be plausibly thought to safeguard our personal
integrity, and they have attempted to amend consequentialism so that it is less
demanding, and therefore less vulnerable to the Objection.
Before I proceed to outlining the subsequent plan of the work, I should address a
methodological concern. My use of the term “consequentialism” to describe the views of
some of the philosophers mentioned above may strike some readers as problematic. The
problem does not lie in identifying philosophers like Railton, Singer, and Unger as
consequentialist. If anyone is a consequentialist, it is someone who believes that the
rightness of action is solely determined by where an outcome ranks on some evaluative
scale, and that outcomes must not be ranked an agent-relative (and perhaps also, timerelative) way. Philosophers like Railton satisfy this definition. But several of the other
philosophers mentioned – such as Scheffler and Mulgan – use agent-relativity to rank
states of affairs. This is a departure from the paradigm understanding of
consequentialism. And the departure from the paradigm understanding of
consequentialism may be problematic because of recent work arguing that any moral
theory may be modeled using an agent-relative and time-relative ordering. I refer here to
9

Or so Bernard Williams argues in Williams 1973.
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what is known in the literature, variously, as Dreier’s Conjecture,10 or the Deontic
Equivalence Thesis.11 This thesis holds that for any non-consequentialist theory, a
consequentialist equivalent may be devised. Because any theory may be
‘consequentialized’, some philosophers have worried that consequentialism as such may
have no substantive content. Thus, if the term ‘consequentialism’ is to have any meaning
at all, it will be necessary to draw more carefully the distinction between
consequentialism and non-consequentialism. More to the point, theories that give
different aims to different agents, such as Scheffler’s and Mulgan’s theories, may count
as forms of non-consequentialism.12 In addition, theories which may sometimes have us
do actions that will not maximize (or satisfice) the good may also not count as
consequentialism on some views. So why count these theories as forms of
consequentialism in this dissertation?13
I count them as such for a couple of reasons. First, the purpose of my project is to
examine modifications of consequentialism that are motivated by the desire to avoid the
demandingness objection. For my purposes, nothing much shall hang on the specific
issue of whether something is, when all is said and done, rightfully called a form of
consequentialism. I will, of course, be concerned to draw lessons for consequentialism
from examining the successes and failings of these theories. But those lessons that I draw
shall not ultimately be affected by whether, for example, Scheffler’s view is a form of
consequentialism or not.
Second, there is some precedent in the literature for taking a broad view of what
10

See Dreier 1993 for the original conjecture, and Dreier 2011 for further discussion, plus Portmore 2011,
87 for other uses of the term.
11
This is Douglas Portmore’s term for Dreier’s Conjecture (Portmore 2011).
12
Campbell Brown has recently argued that agent-relative theories violate a necessary component of
consequentialism; see Brown 2011 for this argument.
13
Thanks to Mark van Roojen for pressing this point.
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counts as consequentialism. The one criterion that all sides in this debate seem to agree
on is that if a theory does not make moral rightness or wrongness solely a function of the
value of outcomes, then that theory is not consequentialist. Beyond this, there is little
agreement. It is not clear that a focus on outcomes alone is sufficient to call a theory
consequentialist. Some philosophers think that this is so, and argue that consequentialism
can incorporate agent-relativity.14 That position is, of course, controversial; many
philosophers do not accept the thesis that agent-relativity is compatible with
consequentialism.15 And some philosophers take the view that ‘consequentialism’ is a
term of art, and that there is no correct way to define the term (beyond the criterion I
mention above), as James Dreier does.16 Although this is an important controversy, it is
nevertheless a controversy that I see as beside the point of the present project. As
mentioned before, what I am really interested in pursuing in this dissertation is a deeper
understanding of the shortcomings of attempts to make consequentialism less demanding,
and what that might mean for future consequentialist theorizing. Since that is my aim,
and because I desire to respect the terminology that other authors use to describe
themselves (particularly in Mulgan’s and Hooker’s cases), I shall, for simplicity’s sake,
refer to them as forms of consequentialism.
In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I shall examine several of these
amended, less demanding forms of consequentialism. I believe that the amended versions
of consequentialism that I shall examine shall either fail to avoid the Demandingness
14

For example, see Broome 1991, Skorupski 1995, and Portmore 2001. Tim Mulgan also argues
strenuously that consequentialists must give up on the idea that the right act on any given occasion is the
act that produces the best consequences, because all the options available for an act consequentialist
concerned to avoid the Demandingness Objection are unpalatable. For that claim, see Mulgan 2001, 25-49,
esp. 49.
15
See McNaughton and Rawling 1991, Pettit 1997, and Brown 2011 for examples of philosophers who
reject agent-relativity as compatible with consequentialism.
16
Dreier 2011, 97.
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Objection, or - because of the way in which they are less demanding forms of
consequentialism - they allow the creation of large-scale collective action problems. I
claim that neither result is acceptable.
In chapter 1, I examine two versions of consequentialism that are related by a
shared theoretical mechanism. This mechanism is the agent-centered prerogative, which
allows an agent to give extra weight to his or her own non-optimal projects in order to
preserve those projects (and thus, the possibility of a meaningful and enjoyable life for
that agent) from being overwhelmed by the demands of morality. In considering the
agent-centered prerogative, I develop the concept of the Polluter’s Dilemma, which is the
sort of large-scale collective action problem alluded to in the previous paragraph. I argue
for the claim that the agent-centered prerogative generally permits the creation of these
problems, and is thus unacceptable as a moral theory, especially in light of the real-world
dangers presented by global climate change.
In chapters 2 and 3, I extend the line of criticism from chapter 1 to two other wellknown versions of consequentialism. In chapter 2, I turn my attention to a well-known
version of indirect consequentialism – that is, a type of consequentialism which does not
directly assess whether an act is right or wrong based on the value of some individual act,
but rather assesses rightness and wrongness based on whether the action satisfies some
other criteria which, if choses, would maximize the good. In particular, I consider how
the most well known version of rule consequentialism would deal with the problem of the
Polluter’s Dilemma and argue that rule consequentialism faces a serious dilemma; that it
either permits the generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas, or fails to avoid the Demandingness
Objection.

12

One other prominent tactic that consequentialists who attempt to avoid the
Demandingness Objection use is to appeal to the notion of having a fair share of good
that one is required to generate. They accept the consequentialist position that we have a
general reason to promote the good, but they also accept the thesis that we are only
required to generate a certain amount of good. Perhaps the most prominent example of
this type of consequentialist theory is Liam Murphy’s. Murphy claims that we are only
required to sacrifice our time and resources up to the point where everyone would be
required to in a situation where everyone complied with the demands of morality. I argue,
in chapter 3, that Murphy’s theory has been moderated so much that it regularly fails to
make intuitively appropriate demands. However, I obtain an important result; Murphy’s
theory does not permit the generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas.
The ultimate point of this dissertation, however, is not a negative one. My ultimate
goal is to learn about what the best, most plausible version of consequentialism would
look like. By the end of chapter 3, having seen the shortcomings of several versions of
moderated consequentialism, we have learned several things about how the best version
of consequentialism would work, and in the opening section of chapter 4 I summarize
and defend these findings. A key component of this defense is a justification of my
contention that generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas is both unacceptable and constitutes a
genuine constraint on acceptable versions of consequentialism, and this justification
comes in chapter 4 as well.
Chapter 4 does not end there, however; nor does the positive project of this
dissertation. I make a case study out of an interesting and novel version of
consequentialism that I believe avoids both the Demandingness Objection and the

13

Polluter’s Dilemma. In addition, in the final part of chapter 3, I consider what can be
done to improve Liam Murphy’s theory of beneficence, and I propose a modified version
of Murphy’s theory that, I believe, avoids the problem Murphy’s theory faces with
appropriate demands.
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Chapter 1: Permissiveness and the Agent-Centered Prerogative

1. Introduction

One general strategy of attempting to defuse the Demandingness Objection is to
moderate the demands that a consequentialist moral theory makes. There are several
tactics one might make use of to achieve this end, but in this chapter I will focus on one;
the agent-centered prerogative. The prerogative’s most notable proponent is Samuel
Scheffler, who has made it the centerpiece of the Hybrid Theory of Morality that he has
proposed in his book, The Rejection of Consequentialism,17 and defended it against
objections in later writings.18 The prerogative has also been adopted in modified form by
Tim Mulgan, who has used it as a crucial ingredient in a novel and complex form of
consequentialism which, Mulgan believes, avoids the Demandingness Objection.19
In what follows, I shall argue that these two prominent versions of the agentcentered prerogative are not acceptable ways of solving the Demandingness Objection. I
argue that both versions of the prerogative are too permissive, in that they permit agents
to cause harms in the pursuit of their own goals. In arguing this, I draw upon and develop
an objection first raised by Shelly Kagan. In section 2, I first discuss Scheffler’s version
of the prerogative and argue that, despite Scheffler’s defense of it, it cannot serve as a
suitable way of dissolving the Demandingness Objection. In sections 3 and 4, I then
17

Scheffler 1994.
Scheffler 1992.
19
Mulgan 2001.
18
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extend this critique to Mulgan’s version of the prerogative and argue that the prerogative
causes Mulgan’s theory to generate a paradoxical result. His theory seems to recommend
drastic action, but at the same time permits agents to defect from the course of drastic
action far too easily. In section 5, I conclude by arguing that the discussion of Mulgan
and Scheffler’s prerogatives reveals a general reason why the agent-centered prerogative,
as a tactic by which the consequentialist may avoid the Demandingness Objection, is
unacceptable. This general reason, I argue, is that by allowing agents the freedom to
privilege their own projects and opt out of doing the actions required to maximize the
general welfare, agent-centered prerogatives will generate situations in which each
person’s position is less good overall than it would be in a situation where agents are not
permitted to privilege their own projects and interests.

2. Scheffler’s Original Agent-Centered Prerogative
It will first be helpful to review Scheffler’s version of the agent-centered
prerogative, his motivation for introducing it, and the criticisms that have been leveled
against it. The motivation for Scheffler’s introduction of the prerogative is to respond to
concerns eloquently raised by Bernard Williams.20 Williams’s concern is that
consequentialism threatens to make morality into a pursuit of such overriding importance
that it alienates us from the pursuit of our own projects and interests. Scheffler’s Hybrid
Theory is an attempt to combine consequentialism with a special status granted to the
agent’s own personal point of view, in effect giving the agent some control over whether
she ought to respond to the demands of morality or pursue some project of her own
20

Williams 1973.
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instead. What Scheffler’s version of the agent-centered prerogative consists in, in
situations when we are weighing the costs to ourselves of doing an action against the cost
to others of not doing that action, is allowing us to give weight to our own interests such
that the weighted value of our own interests will sometimes outweigh the unweighted
impersonal value of our actions. Scheffler says that this will enable us to save the agent’s
personal point of view in the following manner:
… It would then allow the agent to promote the non-optimal outcome of his
choosing, provided only that the degree of its inferiority to each of the superior
outcomes he could instead promote in no case exceeded, by more than the
specified proportion, the degree of sacrifice necessary for him to promote the
superior outcome. If all of the non-optimal outcomes available to the agent were
ruled out on these grounds, then and only then would he be required to promote the
best overall outcome.21

In general, the factor by which we give weight to the costs to ourselves will be
quite high. This is because if the factor is set too low, then the Hybrid Theory will be too
weak to deflect the Demandingness Objection, especially when relatively small donations
have the potential to do a lot of good in the hands of the appropriate aid organization. So
we must set the weighting factor high. Scheffler is not specific about just how high the
weighting factor is. It must, however, be enough to give us a prerogative that will be of
some use to us. Tim Mulgan, in constructing an illustration of how Scheffler’s
prerogative is supposed to work, suggests that agents might be allowed to give 600 times
more weight to their own interests than to the interests of others. This is bound to seem
unusually high to some readers. Nevertheless, nothing of importance seems to hang on
the exact number; it is simply that the weighting must be high if Scheffler’s prerogative is
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to be of any use in helping us to avoid being overwhelmed by an obligation to aid the
desperately needy in far-flung places. 22
Shelly Kagan’s challenge to Scheffler’s view is that the agent-centered prerogative
permits agents to not only allow but actually cause harms in the pursuit of their own nonoptimal projects.23 The challenge may be illustrated by an example. Consider two cases
in which I require a large sum of money to pursue my own projects successfully. Let us
stipulate that this sum of money is $10,000, and I require this amount because I have an
antique car that I want to transport to a car show. In one version of this case, I already
have $10,000, and I chose to spend it on transporting my car, instead of donating the
$10,000 to charity organizations that would have saved the life of a stranger. In a second
version of this case, I do not have $10,000, so I secretly kill my uncle in order to inherit
$10,000, which I then use to transport my car to the car show. 24 Kagan argues that there
is a morally significant difference between these two cases that Scheffler’s Hybrid
Theory is unable to take into account. According to the Hybrid Theory, I am permitted to
value my own project that costs $10,000 over the life of another person, thereby allowing
that person to die. But because the Hybrid Theory contains no restriction on the types of
action that an agent might pursue, I am equally permitted to value my own project that
costs $10,000 over the life of another person, and killing that person in doing so. So,
according to Kagan, it is the lack of a deontological restriction - an agent-centered
restriction - that generates such troublesome cases for Scheffler.
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One might wonder exactly what it is that differentiates Scheffler’s Hybrid Theory
from ordinary consequentialism on this point. After all, ordinary consequentialism also
permits us to cause harms in some cases. For example, if I am a commissioned officer on
board a naval ship and my ship will sink unless I order a subordinate to perform an
extremely hazardous repair in a burning room that will surely result in his death,
consequentialism would say that I ought to order the subordinate to his death in order to
prevent a greater catastrophe, which would be the loss of the ship with all hands. Other
instances of this general type of case can be constructed, and one might question the
consequentialist about whether such cases are generally permissible. I will not pursue that
line of thought. What I am interested in pointing out is that there is a general difference in
what ordinary consequentialism permits and what Scheffler’s Hybrid View permits. This
general difference is that ordinary consequentialism permits agents to cause harm in
pursuit of an optimal outcome,25 whereas Scheffler’s Hybrid Theory, as a result of his
inclusion of an agent-centered prerogative, must not only sometimes permit harms caused
in pursuit of an optimal outcome, but also sometimes permit agents to cause harm in
pursuit of a non-optimal outcome.26 The case of the car show mentioned earlier is an
example of this general type of case. Because the $10,000 I spend on taking my car to the
car show would do far more good if spent elsewhere, and because ordinary
consequentialism does not permit me to weigh my interests more heavily than those of
other people, ordinary consequentialism would not permit me to take my car to the car
show. And because this action does not maximize the good to begin with, ordinary
25
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consequentialism would furthermore not permit me to cause extra harm in pursuit of this
aim. So Kagan’s case would not pose any problem for ordinary consequentialism. It is,
however, a problem for Scheffler’s Hybrid Theory precisely because the Hybrid Theory
allows us to weigh the costs to ourselves differently than the costs to others.
In responding to Kagan, Scheffler says that if his theory permits us to allow harms
of a certain size to befall others for us to pursue our own projects, then it must also allow
us to directly cause harms of the same size in order for us to pursue our own projects.27
But in practice, Scheffler says, agents will not find it an equal choice between allowing a
harm to happen in order to pursue their own projects, and committing a harm in order to
pursue their own projects. Committing harm is costlier for an agent, leaving themselves
less time and resources for the projects that they would rather be working on. In
particular, Scheffler says that if the benefit an agent is looking for is only obtainable by
an act of killing, then the agent can obtain the benefits only along with increased mental
suffering.28 An agent might be filled with any combination of items on this (not
necessarily exhaustive) list: self-loathing, disgust, guilt, shame, humiliation, fear of being
caught, and horror at their own monstrous nature. In addition, they might suffer from
“profound distortions of personality and of the capacity to lead a fulfilling life.”29
Such a response is plausible; it is not, after all, unheard of for criminals to turn
themselves in for their crimes, and it certainly seems possible that a criminal might be
consumed with guilt and self-loathing after the crime has been committed. It is strange,
though, that Scheffler would rest his argument on psychological generalizations that may,
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after all, turn out to not apply to all agents. As Mulgan notes, an agent without the
relevant psychological capacities just detailed would be permitted by the agent-centered
prerogative to kill her own uncle.30
But Scheffler’s critics need not appeal to the existence of agents for whom killing
would not be a psychological cost to make trouble for the agent-centered prerogative.
Highly plausible Kagan-style objections can be developed without resorting to examples
involving killing. Ramon Das has recently developed just such a case.31 Das asks us to
imagine an accountant on the low end of the pay scale working at a highly profitable law
firm. She is aware that her work is worth more to the firm than she is paid for it; still, she
is able to lead a reasonably comfortable life. One day, she is able to embezzle $10,000
without getting caught, and does so without hesitation. She reassures herself of the
permissibility of her actions by this reasoning: “Scheffler’s agent-centered prerogative
permits me to forego donating $10,000 to save the life of a person in desperate need,
since I am allowed to give weight to my own interests and prefer a non-optimal outcome
if the weighted value of making a huge sacrifice on my part is greater than the impersonal
value that would be produced if I made the sacrifice. Since that is the case, there is no
morally significant difference between that case and my taking $10,000 from the law
firm, because the personal value of my having this money is greater than the impersonal
value of having it in the possession of the firm; my multi-millionare bosses have more
money than they know what to do with anyway. And since there is no deontological
restriction in Scheffler’s theory on me to avoid doing harm and no distinction between
doing a harm and allowing a harm to occur, what I have done must be permissible.”
30
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Making use of the same tactic against Das that he used against Kagan will not help
Scheffler much. It is plausible to claim that killing involves a high psychological cost to
(some) killers. It is, however, far from clear that embezzling from a workplace and boss
that one resents involves as heavy a cost, if it involves a psychological cost at all.
If we move away from cases that involve committing harms directly against other
agents and consider instead cases which involve indirect harms to other agents, we may
find that the Hybrid Theory is, again, unacceptably permissive. Here I will introduce a
variation on Kagan’s objection to Scheffler, the intent being that Kagan-style cases are
actually quite widespread and need not involve cases involving obvious crimes, such as
murder or embezzlement. Consider a case that involves me working on some non-optimal
project, and in doing so I indirectly contribute to a harm that befalls other agents. Let us
suppose again that I am an
Antique Car Aficionado. I desire to take my car to a classic car show. This car
would no doubt be the talk of the show, for it is an unusual 1937 Aston Martin of a
limited production run, and being the talk of the show would benefit me greatly;
both professionally, because I want to be invited to more car shows, and personally,
because I have recently been divorced because I spent too much time on the car and
I need to show my former partner that my investment was worthwhile. Transporting
my car would involve hauling it to the car show on another, heavier car, and this
hauling would involve the release of automobile emissions into the atmosphere,
which pollute the environment and contribute in a small way to climate change.32
So then, I have two options:
32
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1)

Stay Home. I bear a high cost of owning and maintaining the car while

gaining no benefit from it. In addition, I am saddled with the cost of knowing that I
lost my relationship for a car. However, because I am not hauling a car around
needlessly on another car, the maximum impersonal value for everyone else is
generated, as compared to option 2.
2)

Show The Car. I bear no cost from making any sacrifice. Somewhat less

impersonal value overall is generated, because of the resulting air and noise
pollution.
Now, I am a well-informed citizen who is well aware of the negative effects of my
car show projects. But, because I am a moral philosophy aficionado as well and have read
Scheffler in my spare time, I reason that since I am allowed to multiply the cost to myself
by a large proportion and weigh that result against the difference in impersonal value
between Stay Home and Show The Car, and since I find that the weighted cost outweighs
the difference between the options, I am allowed to pursue Show The Car.
In the case just described, I rely on the assumption that my share of harm that might
result from contributing to climate change is rather small -- small enough, that is, to be
outweighed by the weighted value an agent is allowed to give to her own interests by the
agent-centered prerogative. One might challenge this assumption with an analogy:
Shooting Range. I am standing on the Nebraska prairie with a deer-hunting rifle. I
can see some deer out in front of me on the prairie, but in addition to the deer,
there are several people standing on the prairie. They are widely spaced out and not
standing near any of the deer, so it is unlikely that any of my shots will hit them.
There is, of course, a reasonable expectation that if I shoot, I will misjudge the wind
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or my hand will not be steady, and one of my shots will go off course, thus
seriously wounding or killing a person standing on the prairie. But even if I shoot
and I miss a person, whether I hit a deer or not, I did something wrong. The harm
lies in the negative expected value of my actions.33
Perhaps it would be proper to think of the harms resulting from my polluting as
more akin to shooting a gun, at random or in a directed manner, into a field where people
are randomly and widely spaced out. We might say that the potential harms resulting
from my polluting actions and the potential harms resulting from my pulling the rifle’s
trigger are analogous in one way because they are both diffuse harms. The harm may not
be solely borne by any one person; by shooting into the field, I have harmed everyone by
putting them in a dangerous situation; by driving my car, I have made the climate a little
more inhospitable for everyone. The harms are analogous in another way; perhaps the
harms are not diffuse. After all, it may be the case that the pollution from my car is just
enough to cause a nearby asthmatic person to have a severe asthma attack, or just enough
to cause a crucial bit of an ice sheet to melt, thus causing a chain reaction in which the
houses of a low-lying island nation’s residents are submerged. Just as with Shooting
Range, the expectation is that people will be injured, and impersonal value will be worse
off overall than if I had not exercised my prerogative to Show The Car. This suggestion is
plausible. If the analogy holds, then I will have a much harder time demonstrating the
permissiveness of the agent-centered prerogative.
It is not clear that the analogy completely holds, however. While the harms
themselves may be analogous in that they may both either be diffuse or concrete, the
causes of the harms are not analogous. In Shooting Range, I am the direct cause of the
33
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harm and I can reasonably foresee that my actions will result in concrete harm to
someone. In Antique Car Aficionado, it is both unclear that I am the direct cause of the
harm, and it is not the case that I can reasonably foresee that my actions will result in
concrete harm to someone. At best, I am a small part in the causal network that leads to a
harm from climate change, or even a harm resulting from the interaction of my car’s
emissions and someone else’s severe asthma. The empirical facts bear this out. Climate
change is not due to the actions of any one person; rather, it is due, at least in large part,
to the aggregate industrial activity of billions of human beings. Furthermore, driving a
heavy truck is not likely to elicit gasps of condemnation from bystanders, whereas I
expect that firing a rifle in the general direction of people would elicit such gasps.
Therefore, I conclude that the analogy does not hold.
If I am correct, then the harms permitted by Scheffler’s agent-centered prerogative
are widespread. Perhaps I desire to regularly eat filet mignon at my favorite steakhouse.
Or perhaps, to make the harm even less, we might suppose that I am a vegetarian who
nevertheless loves to eat gouda. The production of the filet mignon, or the gouda,
inevitably involves pollution of various kinds as well, to say nothing of the harms that
befall cows directly in the process of producing the filet or the gouda. Nevertheless, my
share of any harm that befalls other people as a result of pollution or climate change, or
as a result of my participation in the production and consumption of meat and/or dairy, is
quite low. Because I am not directly causing huge harms to befall other people, and
because the good which I derive from pursuing my own projects can be quite intense for
me, the extra weighting that Scheffler’s agent-centered prerogative permits me to give
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my projects will have the result that a very wide range of sub-optimal behaviors with
collectively terrible long-term consequences for all agents will be permitted.
Perhaps Scheffler might say that I have made a mistake in thinking that my share of
contributing to global warming is small; in reality, my impact is larger than I think, and I
ought to be weighing the personal value of my actions against the impersonal value of the
foreseeable long-term effects of climate change. Perhaps the best version of his agentcentered prerogative requires me to think about weighing my non-optimal interests
against the impersonal value that might foreseeably result from me (and everyone else)
doing optimal actions. If that is Scheffler’s response, then I would find it hard to see what
the principled rule is by which I decide whether to weigh my non-optimal interests
against the impersonal value that can be directly derived from my optimal actions or
against the impersonal value that might be indirectly derived from many people doing
optimal actions. But perhaps more importantly, making this shift would seem to me to
make the impersonal value of my optimal actions so great that the agent-centered
prerogative ineffective at allowing me to sometimes prefer my own non-optimal projects.
So this response is not available to Scheffler.
Scheffler’s version of the agent-centered prerogative, as we have seen, is subject to
the charge that, in the absence of deontological restrictions, it allows agents to commit
harms in pursuit of their non-optimal projects.34 Although it is possible that Scheffler is
correct and agents generally find it costlier to commit harms than to make sacrifices, my
project in this section was to demonstrate that it is possible to generate Kagan-style
counterexamples to Scheffler’s view that do not rely on harms that consist in obvious
crimes; indeed, it is possible to describe harms that Scheffler’s prerogative allows us to
34
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commit that not only do not rely on the harms in question being obvious crimes at all, but
in fact work in the long run to produce a sub-optimal outcome. If the agent-centered
prerogative is to remain a live option for the consequentialist seeking to avoid the
Demandingness Objection, we will need to find a better version of the prerogative. The
question remains, however; is Tim Mulgan’s version of the agent-centered prerogative
any better than Scheffler’s?

3. An Improved Prerogative: Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism
One of Mulgan’s most significant contributions to the literature on the
Demandingness Objection comes in his book, The Demands of Consequentialism. Here,
after extensive discussion and criticism of many previous attempts to avoid the
Demandingness Objection, he proposes a theory that he terms Combined
Consequentialism, which is so named because it is a combination of several different
consequentialist theoretical mechanisms. Combined Consequentialism’s basis is
Mulgan’s distinction between two “realms of moral choice,” the Realm of Necessity and
the Realm of Reciprocity.35
Mulgan’s thesis is that different consequentialist theories apply in the different
realms. In the Realm of Necessity, current members of the moral community are faced
with the choice of whether to enable those excluded from the moral community to
participate in it, the crucial interaction being between those who are currently active
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members and those who cannot even participate.36 But in the Realm of Reciprocity, equal
members of the moral community decide how to interact with one another. According to
Mulgan, when we are making decisions in the Realm of Necessity, maximizing the
overall good is the right approach. This requires us to make sacrifices in order to turn
potential members of the moral community into active members of the moral community.
When we are making decisions in the Realm of Reciprocity, however, we ought to follow
a rule consequentialist code of conduct that hews more closely to common-sense
morality, and avoids some of the various problems associated with simple act
consequentialism.
These realms are generated by the distinction that Mulgan draws between different
categories necessary to human well-being. Mulgan’s account of well-being, on the
whole, resembles what Derek Parfit has referred to as an Objective List Theory of
Welfare.37 On this sort of view, well-being consists in satisfying a number of different
categories that work together to promote one’s overall sense that one’s life is going well,
and whether they are good for us or not does not depend on what we think of them or
how much happiness they produce for us.
Mulgan’s view on well-being, and the basis for his distinction between the two
moral realms, is that individual well-being is comprised of the satisfaction of needs and
goals. Needs include the things that are necessary for an agent to take part in the moral
community, among them food, shelter, freedom from unnecessary suffering, and the like.
Needs are the foundation for goals. Once a person has their needs fulfilled, they are in a
position to set goals for themselves. Goals, for Mulgan, are the things that the satisfaction
36
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and setting of which determines, all things considered, how well a person’s life goes. But
goals only matter morally if they are achieved in the right way; they require autonomy,
which can only be had if the agent’s needs are satisfied. Needs are not like this; to
Mulgan, it does not matter how needs are promoted, since the fulfillment of the need is
what gives the need its value.
The third major component of Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism is a
modification of Scheffler’s agent-centered prerogative. As with Scheffler, the motivation
for including the prerogative in Combined Consequentialism is to ensure the agent’s
autonomy to pursue her own goals. Mulgan, having extensively reviewed the variety of
objections to Scheffler’s Hybrid View and having stated his own, modifies the
prerogative by replacing the constant with a variable; thus, “As the cost the agent must
bear to produce a given amount of good increases, the weight she is allowed to give to
her own interests also increases.”38
We are now in a position to see how Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism works.
Here is a case that Mulgan frequently refers to:
Affluent’s Tale. Affluent is, as her name implies, an affluent citizen of a developed
country, sitting at her desk with a checkbook in one hand and two pamphlets in the
other. One of the pamphlets is from a reputable international aid organization. The
other is from a local theater company, advertising their latest production. Affluent
has enough money to make a donation to the charity, or to buy tickets to the
theater, but not enough money to do both. Because of her love for the theater, she
buys the tickets, even though she knows the money would have done much more
good in the hands of the charity.39

What Affluent is permitted to do, under Combined Consequentialism, depends on
what sort of sacrifices she has made already. If she has not previously made any
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contributions to charity, Combined Consequentialism would intuitively require her to
donate a large portion of her money to charity - most probably, the factor by which she is
allowed to give weight to her own interests is not yet large enough to outweigh the needs
of others. If she has previously made donations, then the increasing cost to Affluent
warrants her giving more weight to her own projects, until at some point the weighted
cost to Affluent outweighs the difference between the impersonal value produces by
donating and the impersonal value produced by not donating.
It seems Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism would deal adequately with
Kagan’s original objection and Ramon Das’s embezzlement case. Das’s accountant,
presumably having sacrificed nothing prior to her decision to embezzle $10,000, would
not be permitted under Mulgan’s prerogative to favor her own interests and embezzle
$10,000. If we stipulated that she is a generous person who has already given much of her
money to charity, Mulgan’s prerogative might permit her to embezzle $10,000; but
another component of Combined Consequentialism - that of Rule Consequentialism,
which governs the Realm of Reciprocity - would not allow it. To see why, note that Das’s
accountant is not desperately needy. In Mulgan’s view, she is a full member of the moral
community. Her assertion that she needs the money more than her multimillionaire
bosses does not matter like it would for someone whose needs have gone unmet, for she
does not “need” the money. It would, rather, satisfy a goal of hers to have more money.
But according to Mulgan, goals only matter morally if they are satisfied in the right way the way we have reciprocally agreed on to be the best way, which is why rule
consequentialism governs this realm. Since the optimal set of rules will forbid stealing,
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Mulgan’s theory is not subject to Das’s modified Kagan-style objection. Mulgan’s theory
thus is an improvement over Scheffler’s.
We need to ask, however, whether Mulgan’s theory is adequate to deal with all
Kagan-style objections. I will suggest that this is not the case. Specifically, I argue that
Mulgan’s view is subject to my modified Kagan-style objection, which I introduced in
the previous section and which I develop more in the next section.

4. Polluter’s Dilemmas and the Demandingness of Combined Consequentialism
We are living in an age of unprecedented climate change. The scientific consensus
has it that aggregate human activity since the Industrial Revolution is a major
contributing factor to the warming of the planet. The warming of the planet has
catastrophic implications, among them: increasing desertification of regions near the
Earth’s equator; increasing numbers of catastrophically powerful storms because of the
warming oceans, especially in tropical regions; increasing levels of famine in the
developing world; increasing levels of migration from regions that become intolerably
hot; increasing competition for increasingly scarce resources; the rise in sea levels
because of the disappearance of the polar ice caps; and the alteration of the food chain of
the oceans, which will likely result in the disruption of the food supply derived from the
ocean, to name a few possible outcomes of the current state of affairs. Though it is clear
that the Earth experiences climate fluctuations naturally, it is hardly deniable that
technologically-enabled human activity has not played some role in the current
precarious state of affairs.
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Every day, we make choices which can contribute to, lessen the impact of, or
completely alleviate various moral problems which confront us. Some of these daily
choices to make include: what we spend our money on, how to get ourselves from one
place to another, which foods to eat and which drinks to drink, how much food to eat, and
so forth. Take the example of choosing one’s form of transportation. Common options
here include walking, bicycling, taking public transportation, or driving one’s own car.
Such a choice may seem innocuous, and indeed seems so to many people; the same is
true of the other problems mentioned. The downside of such actions is often obscure. It is
not obvious what sort of harm there could be from making the choice to drive one’s own
car. Yet the moral problems that these choices can contribute to are anything but
innocuous.
I am attempting to motivate and systematically describe a certain kind of problem
case. Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, describes this kind of case as a “ManyPerson Dilemma.”40 There are many kinds of Many-Person Dilemmas, but the basic
template of the dilemma is the same: If most or all agents choose to benefit themselves in
a certain way, the overall results will be worse for all. Consider, for example, the result of
all the individual tokens of the decision to use one’s own automobile to get from one
place to another. One instance of such a decision imposes no particular burden on anyone
else.41 However, the same decision, repeated many times for decades by the
overwhelming majority of all citizens of the developed world and a non-trivial number of
citizens in the developing world, has contributed to a situation which threatens the
general well-being. One instance of a decision to get one’s food from an unsustainable
40
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food source does not impose any great burden on anyone, though it is perhaps harmful in
some small way.42 However, the same decision, repeated countless times for decades by
the overwhelming majority of all citizens of the developed world and a non-trivial
number of citizens in the developing world, has contributed to a situation which threatens
the overall well-being of all. For brevity’s sake, I shall refer to these types of Dilemmas
as Polluter’s Dilemmas in what follows.
How are Polluter’s Dilemmas like the objections that Kagan raises and that Das has
further developed, and how are they different? They are similar because they propose that
the agent-centered prerogative allows an agent to create harm in pursuit of her own goals,
because there is no deontological restriction on doing harm. This is one of Kagan’s goals
in objecting to Scheffler’s Hybrid Theory; the other, naturally, is to point out that the
difficulty arises in part because the Hybrid Theory lacks the distinction between doing
and allowing. Here I am focused on the first aspect of Kagan’s objection that I have
listed. My argument shall be that Mulgan’s version of the agent-centered prerogative
permits Polluter’s Dilemmas to occur, because (as argued in section 2 of this chapter)
each individual’s share of the harm done by pollution is small enough to be easily
outweighed by the weighted value accorded to an agent’s interests by the agent-centered
prerogative. Furthermore, I shall argue that Mulgan’s theory, despite its ostensible goal of
being a moderate consequentialist theory, turns out to be far too permissive in the case of
Polluter’s Dilemmas, even when the Polluter’s Dilemma seems to fall into the Realm of
Necessity.
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First, I reiterate a crucial argument of the second section of this chapter. We saw
previously that Scheffler’s agent-centered prerogative permits Polluter’s Dilemmas to
occur. It permits them to occur because it permits an agent to multiply the cost incurred
by them of making a sacrifice by the weighted value of the agent-centered prerogative,
and then compare the result against the difference in impersonal value between the
superior and inferior alternatives. I argued that, frequently, the agent-centered prerogative
will generate the result that agents are allowed to prefer their own interests and carry out
an action that involves pollution. I also argued against the possible objection that the
harms involved in one individual’s polluting act are actually quite great. This was
accomplished by showing that a proposed analogy fails to be analogous to the case of the
harms involved in pollution.
It would not do to simply reiterate the points above and proceed to the second part
of my argument against Mulgan, however; I must take into account the modification that
Mulgan has made to his version of the agent-centered prerogative. According to Mulgan,
an agent is not permitted to assign a constant weighted value to her own interests; rather,
an agent is allowed to assign more weight to her own interests if she is asked to bear
more sacrifice. This has the result that if an agent has either made many sacrifices in the
past or is being asked to bear a very large sacrifice right now, that agent may assign a
high weight to her own interests. If she has not previously made any sacrifices, Combined
Consequentialism does not permit her to perform her preferred non-optimal action; she
must, instead, make the sacrifice for the impersonal good and bear the cost.
Thus, in Antique Car Aficionado, if I have not previously made any sacrifice
toward the greater good, there are two possibilities. The first is that it is possible that I
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would be required to refrain from taking my car to the car show. It is possible that, since I
would not be permitted to assign any extra weight to my own interests, the unmodified
cost that I would be required to bear would not be high enough to outweigh the
impersonal value that my sacrifice would generate. The other possibility is that, because
the harms involved in my act of pollution are so small, the unmodified cost that I bear
would, by itself, allow me to prefer my own interests.
I do not believe that it matters which possibility is actually the case. If the second
possibility is the case, then it will be trivially easy for me - whenever I experience a
moderate inconvenience - to truly claim that my interests trump the general good. If the
first possibility is the case, then I will still be permitted to perform the polluting action if I
make some relatively minor sacrifices elsewhere. Perhaps I constantly spend time and
effort recycling what can be recycled out of my garbage. Perhaps, instead, I go to great
effort to recycle electronic waste. Whatever my sacrifice, this sacrifice will enable to me
put the agent-centered prerogative to work, pursuing my own interests (and thereby
committing polluting actions) when it matters to me.
Now, what does Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism say about such cases? In
trying to answer this question, a natural starting point is to ask the question of which
realm of moral choice such cases are sorted into.43 There are a couple of choices:
decisions about such choices may be sorted into the Realm of Reciprocity, or into the
Realm of Necessity. The Realm of Reciprocity, it will be recalled, is the realm of moral
choice in which agents interact with one another on more or less equal grounds; it is
where individual members of the moral community promote their own interests, work on
43
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joint projects together, and set and achieve goals for themselves under conditions of their
own autonomy; according to Mulgan, this realm is to be governed under rule
consequentialist terms. By contrast, the Realm of Necessity is where agents interact in an
unequal way; in this realm, members of the moral community are confronted with people
who are not yet members of the moral community, and are required under act
consequentialist terms to sacrifice either up to the point where such members all have
their needs fulfilled, or up to the point where Combined Consequentialism’s version of
the Agent-Centered Prerogative kicks in, allowing the ones who sacrifice to pursue their
other projects.
Perhaps because Mulgan’s theory was not designed with Polluter’s Dilemmas in
mind, it is possible to describe ways in which Polluter’s Dilemmas may be addressed in
both realms of moral choice. Some kinds of choices affecting the ways in which we
interact with our environment are made at the collective level, and this suggests that such
a Polluter’s Dilemma falls into the Realm of Reciprocity. We freely and autonomously
interact with one another, and on the basis of both the best available evidence of the risks
involved and the extent of our own willingness to put up with restrictions on our
autonomy and the types of goals we may pursue, we collectively decide (and constantly
revisit our collective decisions) on what types of goals and projects are permissible with
regard to our environment, and what types of goals and projects are incompatible with the
protection of our environment. The environment is valuable to us, on this view, because
to damage our environment is to damage our ability to achieve our goals. Our response
to the Polluter’s Dilemma would be essentially on rule consequentialist grounds.
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This answer is insufficient. Given the myriad possible catastrophic effects of
climate change canvassed above, it would be naïve to say that such changes our
environment have the ability to affect us only at the level of our ability to pursue our own
goals as free and equal members of the moral community. We should, instead, think of
the Polluter’s Dilemma as falling into the Realm of Necessity. If Polluter’s Dilemmas fall
into the Realm of Reciprocity, then the harm from Polluter’s Dilemmas must be confined
to the harms covered by the Realm of Reciprocity. These sorts of harms include damage
to our own autonomy, damage to our ability to pursue the kinds of projects that hold
significance for us and that we freely choose to associate ourselves with. But this is not
what we find. The possible harms of climate change are not like harms to our political
freedoms, such as our freedom to choose our own religious path and the freedom to
associate with whom we please. Rather, they are harms that strike at our needs, in
Mulgan’s sense of that term. They threaten our food supply, our shelter, and our general
safety. It is true to say that the effects of climate change harm our autonomy and our
ability to pursue our own goals, but they do so not by striking directly at those things, but
rather by causing our needs to go unfulfilled. Without those needs fulfilled, we can hardly
be expected to interact with each other as free and roughly equally positioned members of
the moral community.
There is a second reason to think that Polluter’s Dilemmas fall into the Realm of
Necessity. This second reason is that the burdens on human lives imposed by climate
change will fall most disproportionately on the desperately needy. Those who are already
desperately needy do not have the resources to respond to a changing environment as
easily as those who do have the resources. People living in developing nations are,
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according to the United Nations Development Programme, are up to 79 times more
vulnerable to the effects of climate disasters than people living in developing nations.44
Desertification and the disruption of water systems could mean that hundreds of millions
of people in Africa and Asia will face water shortages.45 Some low-lying countries with
high population density, such as the Netherlands and Bangladesh, face the loss of much
of their land area. Bangladesh, in particular, could lose up to 18 percent of its land area.46
Likely, the Netherlands will be better able to adapt to climate change, given its position
of relative wealth. Bangladesh, one of the poorest nations in the world, will have more
difficulty in this regard. Low-lying coastal areas that have a disproportionately high share
of a nation’s GDP, such as in wealthier coastal cities in India, China, and Guyana, are at
risk as well, and the disruption of such areas can have a devastating effect on the
economic development and well-being of entire nations.47
I conclude that we ought to think of Polluter’s Dilemmas as primarily falling into
Mulgan’s Realm of Necessity. This mean that our decision making about Polluter’s
Dilemmas is to be governed under an act consequentialist framework; that is, we are to
act so as to maximize the good, at least until we reach the point where Mulgan’s version
of the agent-centered prerogative kicks in. This conclusion probably implies a number of
changes in our own behavior at the individual level, including things like adopting a
vegetarian diet, driving one’s car far less, riding one’s bicycle far more, purchasing
carbon offsets to alleviate the costs of our polluting behavior, living in a smaller and more
energy-efficient dwelling, and generally attempting to tread more lightly on the Earth’s
44
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surface than we have been doing by giving up some of the luxuries to which we have
grown accustomed.
Whether one believes that climate change is better dealt with through penalizing
polluting behaviors or through encouraging ecologically friendly technological
development, the above recommendations in general seem like a plausible response to
global warming, if widely adopted enough. Would Mulgan’s view recommend such
actions? Yes, it would; but the agent-centered prerogative, paradoxically, would allow
agents to opt out of doing those actions far too easily. If Mulgan’s view did not contain
his version of the agent-centered prerogative, he could seemingly not escape the
Demandingness Objection in the case of the Polluter’s Dilemma. But I suggest -- because
of my previous arguments that the harms leading to Polluter’s Dilemmas are very small,
and that agents will be allowed by Mulgan’s agent-centered prerogative to prefer a nonoptimal action very easily in the case of Polluter’s Dilemmas -- that Mulgan’s view
allows us to far too easily exercise the agent-centered prerogative. Thus, Mulgan’s view
has the potential to generate Polluter’s Dilemmas.
Mulgan’s view thus succeeds in avoiding the Demandingness Objection. But this
seems like a Pyrrhic victory. Indeed, the entire rationale for developing Combined
Consequentialism was to find a plausible, moderate form of Consequentialism that made
reasonable demands. Given the possible dangers posed by climate change, it seems like a
plausible moderate form of Consequentialism should tell us to take a couple kinds of
action; action to best position our society for the future, and action to mitigate the damage
already done. But instead, the result was to find a theory that can permit agents to
continue causing damage.
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5. Why the Agent-Centered Prerogative is Generally Unacceptable as a
Component of a Consequentialist Moral Theory
Where does this leave the agent-centered prerogative in general, then? The answer
to this question, I believe, is that the very notion of an agent-centered prerogative is
generally unhelpful for the Consequentialist seeking a way to dissolve the
Demandingness Objection. The agent-centered prerogative will, in short, create more
problems than it solves. The reason for this is that the agent-centered prerogative
generates situations in which agents are worse off than they would be in situations where
no agent-centered prerogative exists. In other words, Consequentialist theories
augmented with an agent-centered prerogative are and will turn out to be directly
collectively self-defeating. Derek Parfit has proposed this notion, in the first part of his
book Reasons and Persons, as a formal constraint on moral theories, and suggests that an
acceptable moral theory ought not to run afoul of this constraint.48 According to Parfit, a
moral theory is directly collectively self-defeating when, if universally and successfully
followed by a community, it would make the overall state of affairs for each agent worse
than the situation would be in which some other moral theory were universally and
successfully followed.49
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Let us review, briefly, what we have seen. I have examined and argued against two
versions of the agent-centered prerogative. Against Scheffler, we have seen that it is
possible to generate a wide variety of situations in which agents will not find it costly to
favor their own projects, and thereby cause harm in doing so. The problem is particularly
acute in the case of pollution. Because the harms of pollution are small, Scheffler’s agentcentered prerogative permits agents to cause a great deal of pollution in pursuit of their
own projects. Against Mulgan’s view, we can extend the same Kagan-style objections
familiar from our discussion of Scheffler and develop them into the following critique of
Mulgan: Combined Consequentialism, applied to the case of climate change and our
response to it, generates seemingly demanding recommendations for dealing with the
problem but, paradoxically, permits agents to defect from the actions that maximize the
general welfare and prefer their own interests far too easily.
The general feature that both of these theories share is a commitment to the notion
that agents are occasionally permitted to give the cost that they bear from making a
sacrifice more weight than the cost the general population would bear if they did not
make that sacrifice. This commitment, of course, stems from the desire to protect the
agent’s personal point of view from being overwhelmed by the demands of morality.
Both of these theories, moreover, lack restrictions on the types of harms one might
commit in the pursuit of one’s own projects. As we have seen, Mulgan’s view includes a
type of restriction - namely, that an agent may not favor her own projects when she has
not previously made any kind of sacrifice. But as I have argued, this is essentially a weak
restriction that does not, in pollution cases, require a great deal of sacrifice to overcome.

41

It is weak in this way because it is not a restriction on the types of actions that the agent
may do, but it is instead a restriction on when the agent may promote her own interests.
I argue that any moral theory that shares this commitment will be subject to the
Polluter’s Dilemma, and thus, to the result that it is a directly collectively self-defeating
moral theory. To see why this is so, imagine us to be in a world where there is a
consequentially optimal level of pollution, such that if we collectively adopt more
stringent restrictions on polluting we will be worse off because industry, research, and
commerce will be too restricted, and such that if we collectively adopt more relaxed
environmental standards we will be worse off because climate change will outstrip our
collective ability to adapt to it. In this situation, let us further stipulate that there is a
specified amount of pollution that constitutes the maximum amount of pollution we are
consequentially licensed to produce, such that producing more pollution beyond our
personal maximum amounts to a departure from our previously-stipulated
consequentially optimal level.
What does the agent-centered prerogative say about pollution beyond the
consequentially optimal level? Here I am assuming, based on my discussion of the
Shooting Range case and the discussion of the harms of pollution in sections 2 and 4,
respectively, of this chapter, that the harms from each unit of pollution are small but
equally harmful. In addition, the agent-centered prerogative must allow agents to value
their own projects and interests many times more than the general welfare if it is to be
effective in allowing the personal point of view some space. With these two assumptions
in hand, plausibly, the agent-centered prerogative will permit agents to generate pollution
above and beyond their personal maximum amounts. The ways in which this may occur
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are not difficult to imagine. Perhaps I have been limiting myself in the amount of steaks I
have been enjoying because, under my society’s general pollution restrictions, I am not
permitted to enjoy more steaks than I have already eaten for a specified time period.
Perhaps I have been taking public transportation and riding my bicycle more often
because I have already used up my allotment of personal car trips for a specified time
period. The list can go on. But the agent-centered prerogative, in each case, will allow me
to value my interest in eating steak, or getting to where I want to go more quickly, more
highly than the harms generated from meat industry- and car-related pollution. By
stipulation, though, in such a situation, every agent will be worse off because climate
change will outstrip our ability to adapt to it.50
One might object: “This does not necessarily constitute a case of being directly
collectively self-defeating, for one of the given goals of the moral theory is to permit the
agent some space for their personal point of view. Here, everything is fine because the
agents are successfully following the moral theory that includes the prerogative, so the
theory cannot be objected to on your grounds.” I would reply that we are discussing
consequentialist moral theories, whose general aim is that the good, whatever it is overall utility, satisfaction of desires, etc. - be maximized. Protecting each agent’s
personal point of view is not a goal given to each agent by the theory. The theory merely
permits agents to protect their own point of view; they are always, however, permitted to
make sacrifices.
Still, might one not think that this result is perfectly fine? After all, protecting the
agent’s personal point of view does seem like a worthwhile goal, even if an unpalatable
50
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side-effect of this addition to a consequentialist moral theory is that we have the option to
benefit ourselves a little bit at the cost of harming others a lot (measured from the point
of view of overall value, of course). This, I claim, is not plausible. A central
consequentialist insight, going back to Bentham and Mill, is that the promotion of the
general good is most important, and thus doing what it takes to promote this end is what
the good consequentialist ought to do. Working toward this end plausibly includes
promulgating and observing regulations that protect our collective living space. Allowing
those regulations to be subverted by a sub-optimal action stemming from some
individual’s idiosyncratic desire is antithetical to the consequentialist project. Put more
generally, it is important that people that people get what actually will promote the
general well-being. Allowing individuals the permission to benefit themselves at the
expense of harming many others a little bit will not generally promote well-being. It is an
empirical matter whether normal human beings would, in practice, avail themselves of
the opportunity to benefit themselves a little at the expense of harming others a lot,
naturally. But it does not seem like a point that stands in need of extensive defending, as I
suspect we are all familiar with cases where we ourselves have done such actions, to say
nothing of our familiarity with other people who regularly do such actions.
A further objection that one might give could run this: “Your general objection to
agent-centered prerogatives is based on the assumption that each unit of pollution is
equally harmful. But why should we believe this? Perhaps pollution is not harmful until it
reaches a critical mass. To see that this is so, imagine a pristine Eden of a world where no
action has ever sullied the environment, and people live in an enlightened and
harmonious relationship with nature. Now imagine a typical early 21st century
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automobile inserted into this world, turned on, allowed to idle in neutral gear for five
seconds, and then turned off, never to start up again. Surely nothing has been harmed by
the minor amount of pollution that has been inserted into this world. Or, if we want to
look even harder for a case of harmless pollution, suppose that in this same pristine Eden,
I travel far from human habitation to the peak of the world’s highest mountain, and I
release a single drop of crude oil from an eyedropper onto the mountain’s rocky summit.
This oil is far from any source of water, and there is no reasonable chance that it will ever
make its way into the world’s water supply. It seems obvious, then, that it is only in great
quantities that pollution is harmful, which puts pressure on your assumption that each
unit of pollution carries a small amount of harm, and each unit is equally harmful.” If this
objection is true, then there are some types of pollution which do not generate Polluter’s
Dilemmas for proponents of the agent-centered prerogative, and my general objection to
the agent-centered prerogative is in danger.
I think it is possible to resist this objection. This objection seems to be saying that
whether each unit of pollution is equally harmful or not depends on how it is experienced
and/or whether it is experienced. I think that this objection is appealing to a kind of
distinction that we can state thus: there is a difference between a small amount of
pollution experienced diffusely and experienced in concentration. Let us say that we
experience pollution in concentration when the amount of this type of pollution
experienced has reached a critical mass in my environment such that it either directly
endangers my health and well-being or produces environmental changes that indirectly
endanger my health and well-being. We may then understand “experiencing pollution
diffusely” as the negation of experiencing pollution in concentration: when I experience
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pollution diffusely, it is not the case that the pollution directly endangers my health and
well-being, and it is not the case that the changes in the environment produced by
pollution indirectly endangers my health and well-being.
On this understanding of the harm of pollution, then, the potential of pollution to
cause harm always exists, but that is not what matters. What matters is whether the harm
is actually caused, and whether pollution actually causes harm or not depends on whether
we experience it diffusely or in concentration. For example, I might experience the car’s
emissions as diffuse pollution, if I was standing next to it, breathing air that was
overwhelmingly normal and only having a very minuscule amount of car emissions
mixed in. Or I might experience it in concentration, if I wrapped my mouth around the
car’s exhaust pipe and inhaled deeply when it was running. If I experience even a small
amount of pollution in concentration, it seems like it will be harmful to me. The
proponent of this objection, though, would not necessarily find that result problematic;
she, rather, would just want there to be some case in which diffusely-experienced
pollution is not harmful.
Another way to understand this objection is as denying that we are at some kind of
point where a consequentially optimal balance between economic and technological
progress on one hand, and climate change on the other, is warranted. We are, thus,
supposing that we are at some point further back on the timeline, before we have any
incentive to bring our pollution regulations and our economic activities into balance with
each other. Thus, there does not seem like there is anything wrong with exercising the
agent-centered prerogative and generating some diffuse pollution as a result.
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I would claim, though, that what the proponent of this objection overlooks is that
diffuse pollution is not simply harmless when it is not in concentration; even in cases
where the pollution generated as a result of other people’s exercise of the agent-centered
prerogative is experienced diffusely, the allegedly harmless diffuse pollution tends to
linger and build up in the environment and eventually reach a point where it ceases to be
diffuse. It is true that agents do not experience diffuse pollution as a direct harm, but it is
not the case that diffuse pollution is not harmful simpliciter. When I experience pollution
diffusely, the environment has not changed enough to indirectly endanger my health and
well-being. But the point is that my environment is changing nonetheless, and it is
changing in ways that are not conducive to my health and well-being. To drive the point
home, consider the following situation. Suppose that I live in a tropical place that is often
inhospitably stormy, but I am well-protected from storms by a strongly-built stone house.
Suppose further that, unbeknownst to me, my neighbor is creating paintings with spray
paint that has a chemical component that is not harmful to humans but has an eroding
effect on stone. This component, over time, will wear down the walls of my house and
leave me exposed to storms. I suspect that we would not want to count my neighbor’s
actions as not harmful to me, even though they do not directly injure me. His actions
damage my environment by building up over time to the point where they reach critical
mass (i.e., causing my house’s stone walls to erode completely). But we should not say
that his actions are only harmful at the point where they erode my walls completely. His
actions are harmful because they constitute a growing threat to me in my environment
that I depend on for health, safety, and well-being.
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But because this threat to me grows slowly and incrementally, and because under a
consequentialist moral theory containing an agent-centered prerogative, it seems like my
neighbor is permitted to use his special spray paint. I am, presumably, permitted to take
other kinds of actions which result in similar effects for him if I value my projects
enough. And thus, we are well on our way to generating a Polluter’s Dilemma. This
tendency of pollution to build up is part of what makes the problem of pollution so
intractable for the proponents of the agent-centered prerogative, and is a reason why we
should be cautious of the notion that pollution is only harmful when it reaches critical
mass. I do not want to be understood as denying that there are types of pollution like that;
but I do want to be understood as claiming that in the actual world, such types of
pollution are vanishingly rare. Canonical kinds of pollution, such as carbon dioxide
emissions, are just the sort of thing that gets the Polluter’s Dilemma going, and thus,
provides us with all the reason we need to think that including agent-centered
prerogatives in a consequentialist moral theory is unwise.
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Chapter 2: Rule Consequentialism’s Dilemma: Demandingness or
Self-Defeat

1. What is Rule Consequentialism?
The standard version of consequentialist moral theory, act consequentialism, holds
that an act is to be evaluated on the basis of whether it produces the best possible state of
affairs, impartially considered. If it does produce the best possible state of affairs, then
the act is counted as morally required (or morally permissible if the act is one of many
possible acts that produce a state of affairs with as much good results as any other); if the
act fails to produce the best possible state of affairs, then the act is counted as morally
wrong. One of the standard objections to act consequentialism, of course, is the
Demandingness Objection. It is easy enough to see why this is the case. Consider Tim
Mulgan’s case of Affluent:
Affluent’s Tale. Affluent is, as her name implies, an affluent citizen of a developed country,
sitting at her desk with a checkbook in one hand and two pamphlets in the other. One of the
pamphlets is from a reputable international aid organization. The other is from a local
theater company, advertising their latest production. Affluent has enough money to make a
donation to the charity, or to buy tickets to the theater, but not enough money to do both.
Because of her love for the theater, she buys the tickets, even though she knows the money
would have done much more good in the hands of the charity.51

Surely, the convinced act consequentialist will say, it is the case that giving aid
organizations that help people suffering from food shortages or extreme poverty, or lack
of sufficient medical resources, or housing, and so forth, would bring about the greatest
amount of good in the world. Affluent’s taste for the theater has no doubt generated some
51
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good, but that amount of good pales in comparison to the good she could easily produce
for other people by donating her money to charity. Thus, act consequentialism must say
that Affluent’s action is morally wrong, because it fails to produce the best possible state
of affairs, impartially considered. This is widely taken to be an extremely demanding
result. Some philosophers have embraced this result.52 Others, however, have accepted
this objection and departed from standard act consequentialism.
There are many ways of making such a departure. Some ethicists, for example,
attempt to derive a more plausible version of consequentialism from the recognition of a
special class of actions as group acts and the proposal that agents are sometimes allowed
to defect from those group acts, while retaining direct consequentialist evaluation of
actions.53 Other ethicists reject the thesis that we are always required to produce the best
possible state of affairs; we are, on such views, required to produce a state of affairs that
is ‘good enough.’54 But an extremely common way of departing from standard act
consequentialism is to shift to an indirect way of evaluating outcomes. One common way
to indirectly evaluate outcomes is to think that we should not directly evaluate the
outcomes of actions; perhaps instead we should evaluate the outcomes produced by the
adoption of a set of rules. Such rules would be adopted precisely because they produce
the best possible outcome. We would not need to evaluate the results of the actions of
people who abide by this “ideal code”: it would be enough to evaluate the ideal code of
rules itself on consequentialist grounds. This is the thought behind a prominent family of
modified indirect consequentialist theories, which are known as rule consequentialist
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theories of morality. These theories claim that an act is morally permissible if and only if
it is recommended by the set of rules that would, if followed, produce the overall best
results, impartially considered.
Rule consequentialism has had several prominent defenders.55 The most influential
recent formulation of rule consequentialism is due to Brad Hooker.56 Because Hooker is
the most prominent current defender of rule consequentialism, it is his version of rule
consequentialism that I shall focus on here. Hooker formulates rule consequentialism in
the following way:
RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM. An act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by
the code of rules whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone
everywhere in each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of wellbeing (with some priority for the worst off). The calculation of a code’s expected
value includes all costs of getting the code internalized. If in terms of expected
value two or more codes are better than the rest but equal to one another, the one
closest to conventional morality determines what acts are wrong.57

It is worth being clear about two aspects of Hooker’s position. First, Hooker is not
interested in what happens if the ideal code is internalized, or accepted, by everyone.
Hooker stipulates, instead, that the ideal code is that which would produce the best
consequences if internalized by the overwhelming majority of the population. The rest
may not accept the code, he says, because we should not expect every group to
55

Richard Brandt, for example, has been an influential figure in the explanation and defense of rule
consequentialism. An early version of Brandt’s view may be found in Brandt 1963, and a fuller statement
of his view may be found in Brandt 1998. John Harsanyi has been another influential defender of rule
consequentialism: see Harsanyi 1977.
56
Hooker 2000.
57
Ibid., 32.

51

internalize the code; young children, the mentally impaired, and the malevolent
sociopaths among us, in particular, should not be expected to internalize the ideal moral
code. After admitting the difficulty of identifying what an “overwhelming majority” is,
Hooker proposes that we think of an “overwhelming majority” as ninety percent of the
population.58
As for the costs of internalizing a code that Hooker refers to in the above-quoted
official definition, Hooker has us imagine that the cost of inculcating a moral code is
distributed widely, and “family, teachers, and the broader culture” are responsible for
inculcating each new generation with the ideal code of rules, just as the situation is in the
actual world.59 This, Hooker suggests, will render the ideal code far more likely to be
adopted by an overwhelming majority, because humans are far more likely to respond
positively to the “organic” teaching and internalization of the moral code, where by
“organic” I mean “more akin to how conventional morality is currently taught” -- that is,
by parents, teachers, other respected authority figures in society, and by observing a
culture’s broader values. A more demanding moral code, taught by enlightened elites,
Hooker argues, would not find easy acceptance, for they would not simply be more costly
to the ordinary person, but the maintenance of a more demanding code of morality would
be higher as well.60
Finally, Hooker stipulates that closeness to conventional morality will be the
tiebreaker between two competing candidates for the ideal moral code, in the event that
two such superior candidates emerge that are the equal of each other in generating the
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optimal level of well-being. The resulting code should be, overall, quite close to
conventional morality, which is a point that rule consequentialists like Hooker often
claim is an advantage for their theory - it coheres well with what we already have.
Indeed, Hooker even sets forward coherence with conventional morality as a desideratum
for a moral theory. He gives a short rationale for this claim. Suppose we are trying to
decide between two moral theories. Theory A is internally consistent, coherent with our
moral convictions after thorough reflection, identifies a fundamental moral principle that
explains our more specific judgments and justifies those judgments impartially, and helps
us reach satisfactory answers to difficult moral problems. But Theory A is at odds with
conventional morality. Theory B is like Theory A, insofar as Theory B satisfies all of the
four qualities of Theory A just given. In addition, Theory B starts from and attempts to
preserve attractive general beliefs about morality. For example, let us suppose that
Theory B respects the common-sense judgment that morality does not constantly require
heroically altruistic sacrifices from its adherents. One may live a morally good life
without being a saint, according to Theory B. Theory A, however, claims that the saintly
altruistic life is the only way to live a morally good life. For another example, let us
suppose that Theory B respects the common-sense judgment that we are sometimes
allowed to give special treatment to our kith and kin. Theory A, however, is rigorously
impartial and demands that we consider our spouses, partners, siblings, parents, relatives,
and friends no more or less than any other human being in the world. In both cases,
Theory A is notably alien to our common-sense moral thinking, whereas Theory B is not.
So there will be some psychological cost to adopting Theory A over Theory B. If we find,
however, that Theory B meets all of Theory A’s beneficial criteria and in addition lacks
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the adoption costs of Theory A, then Theory Ba has a distinct and decisive advantage. As
Hooker would say, Theory B would be “markedly superior.”61 Theory B would do a
much better job “of matching and tying together our moral convictions.”62 Hooker
painstakingly works to depict rule consequentialism as a theory that not only
recommends much of what conventional morality familiarly also recommends to us, but
has the additional advantage of providing a foundational rationale and justification for the
code of rules that it recommends.63

2. How Hooker Hopes to Avoid the Demandingness Objection
Having sketched Hooker’s view, it is time to consider just how Hooker’s rule
consequentialism might avoid the Demandingness Objection. Perhaps it requires much
sacrifice from us for the purposes of producing the best overall state of affairs for
everyone. The ideal moral code might include a rule requiring us to donate a portion of
our income to an effective charity. Perhaps even the ideal moral code will not prevent us
from being required, in some cases, to sacrifice a great deal of our time and resources for
the benefit of others, such that we are alienated from our own projects or might be
required to give up something of moral value. 64
Hooker’s method of avoiding the Demandingness Objection is to argue for the
thesis that rule consequentialism ought not to be based upon compliance with the moral
rules, but instead upon acceptance of the moral rules. Acceptance of the moral rules, in
Hooker’s view, consists in having the disposition to comply with the rules under certain
61
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circumstances, to encourage others to comply with the rules, and to be favorably inclined
toward those who comply with the rules (and vice versa for those who flout the rules).65
Thus, in Hooker’s view, the ideal moral code is the code that we could reasonably expect
to produce the best overall state of affairs if the overwhelming majority of people adopted
it. So if we are choosing between a more demanding code that cannot be expected to be
widely adopted and a less-demanding code that is reasonably expected to be widely
adopted, rule consequentialism would recommend that we adopt the less demanding code
precisely because that is the code that can be reasonably expected to generate the best
overall state of affairs. Call this Hooker’s move to acceptance rule consequentialism.
This is a persuasive point. Even an advocate of a more demanding view, such as
Peter Singer, seems to concede ground to something along the lines of Hooker’s rationale
for acceptance rule consequentialism. Despite the rather more extreme view he proposes
in one of his most famous articles,66 Peter Singer adopts a moderate view on what rule
ordinary people actually ought to follow. On a Web site related to Singer’s charitable
work and his recent book, we find the following:
When did you last spend money on something to drink, when drinkable water was
available for nothing? If the answer is “within the past week” then you are
spending money on luxuries while children die from malnutrition or diseases that
we know how to prevent or cure.67

The implication here seems to be that spending money on, for example, a Coca-Cola
when drinkable water was available for nothing is an action that morality condemns.
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That, of course, is a position in keeping with the strong version of Singer’s principle of
harm prevention.68 Despite this implication, the Web site related to Singer’s charitable
work seems to concede that, despite what morality really requires of us, it is perhaps
better if we did not really act just as morality requires; instead, we ought to adopt a norm
that is easier for everyone to comply with, both in terms of personal sacrifice and helping
others to feel comfortable with making a sacrifice:
If everyone who can afford to contribute to reducing extreme poverty were to give
a modest proportion of their income to effective organizations fighting extreme
poverty, the problem could be solved. It wouldn’t take a huge sacrifice.
But first we need to change the culture of giving – to make giving to
help the needy something that any normal decent person would do. To help bring
about this change, we need to be upfront about our giving.69

Hooker’s move to acceptance rule consequentialism is designed to thwart the
Demandingness Objection. Both rule consequentialism and act consequentialism tend to
agree, as Hooker observes, in how agents should do their everyday moral thinking; they
should apply rules of thumb, rather than seeking to calculate precise consequences.70 But
Hooker plausibly points out just how intractable the demands of complying with act
consequentialism could be. One way in which people would find act consequentialism
quite demanding is act consequentialism’s insistence on impartial consideration of each
person’s well-being. This conflicts with our natural impulse to favor our close friends,
family members, and perhaps members of our relevant communities. Hooker argues that
68
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the cost of internalizing the act consequentialist moral principle of always acting so as to
maximize the good would be incredibly, implausibly costly; we would have to be
constantly concerned about the “suppression of strong affections and partiality.”71 The
cost of suppressing individual partiality would not only be borne by all, but it would have
to be continuously suppressed in each new generation. In a world, however, where a
more modestly demanding rule is accepted by all, and in particular one that hews closer
to conventional morality, the cost of acceptance is less high. Not only that, but (as the
above quotes from the Web site related to Peter Singer’s charitable work indicate) the
cost of acceptance might dwindle over time. As more people become acclimated to the
idea of regular charitable giving, such giving becomes more widely seen as less of a
burdensome sacrifice and more of a normal practice. To this end, Hooker thinks that a
progressive rule making a moral duty out of donating at least one percent of your income,
up to ten percent of your income for those who are wealthy, will be an excellent
candidate for inclusion in the ideal moral code.72
Another point that Hooker makes is that the rule consequentialist need not accept a
fundamental commitment to maximize the good. The fundamental commitment, Hooker
thinks, needs to be to the notion that rule consequentialism explains and ties together all
of our previously held moral convictions, as well as offering us aid in resolving difficult
71
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ethical questions. Rule consequentialism itself must accept a fundamental commitment to
select rules by the criteria of whether they produce the best overall state of affairs, but
that is not the same thing as an agent being required to choose acts so as to maximize the
good. An agent is not required to so act, Hooker thinks; an agent is simply required to
abide by the rules that rule consequentialism recommends, and these rules will not be too
demanding.
Such are the ways in which Hooker hopes to escape the Demandingness Objection.
The ultimate basis for rule consequentialism is our intuitions about what the ideal moral
code consists in, and how it would affect the society that it is widely internalized in.

3. Being Careful about Hypothetical Behavior and Belief
A couple of ways to argue that Hooker does not actually escape the Demandingness
Objection exist. I want to start by discussing a way that I do not favor, and then proceed
to a more promising way of criticizing rule consequentialism on this point.
I do not favor a line of criticism that seeks to rule out rule consequentialism on the
grounds that it might require significant sacrifices in the actual world. I venture to say
that any view worth calling a plausible view about morality would sometimes require
significant sacrifices in the actual world. Virtue ethics, for example, would say that I have
failed to develop the best kind of character, and it would say that I have done something
morally blameworthy, if I refuse to wade in to the pond and save the drowning child. If I
refuse, I have perhaps demonstrated a lack of courage, or a lack of appropriate empathy
for the victim, or the vice of selfishness (or a combination of several or all of the above
vices). Even if there are many drowning children, practical deliberation may require me
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to spend a great deal of time wading in and pulling out one child after the other. That may
add up to a significant cost to me in terms of my time and resources. But I think there
would be something wrong if we criticized virtue ethics in this case by saying that it is
too demanding. Some demands are entirely appropriate, and to demonstrate that a moral
view sometimes requires significant demands in the actual world is not enough. Let me
pursue this line of thought with regard to rule consequentialism.
In the actual world, nothing like overwhelming acceptance of an ideal moral code
exists. The best we can hope for is partial acceptance. What does rule consequentialism
require for those who accept the ideal moral code, but do so under conditions of less than
overwhelming acceptance of the code? As a hint, when discussing a modified version of
Peter Singer’s famous drowning child case, Hooker argues that rule consequentialism
would require a rescuer to save two children, despite the fact that saving one would be
that rescuer’s fair share (which he has already done).73 Hooker introduces a more general
rule later on in his discussion of what the ideal code requires under conditions of noncompliance, which reads as follows: “Over time agents should help those in greater need,
especially the worst off, even if the personal sacrifices involved in helping them add up to
a significant cost to the agents. The cost to the agents is to be assessed aggregatively, not
iteratively.”74 By this, Hooker means that he does not want agents, for every time that a
sacrifice is called for from them, to forget what they had to sacrifice on prior occasions.
That would be to assess the personal cost to the agent iteratively. In other words, when an
agent assesses the personal cost of sacrifice iteratively, every iteration of a choice of
whether to make a sacrifice is considered in isolation from every other iteration of that
73
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choice. By contrast, Hooker means to say that agents ought to calculate the cost to
themselves aggregatively when they are called upon to make sacrifices. They ought to, in
other words, not forget all the previous times that they had to sacrifice; they will need to
aggregate all the costs of each instance of a choice of whether to make a sacrifice. Such a
way of assessing costs, Hooker thinks, will allow rule consequentialism to avoid a high
degree of demandingness.
It is notable that the rule regarding sacrifice under conditions of widespread nonacceptance sometimes permits me to incur significant costs. That seems true because of
what Hooker says with regard to the modification of Singer’s drowning child case. It isn’t
clear that there is a way for me to escape such costs. Unlike Samuel Scheffler’s Hybrid
View and Tim Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism, Hooker’s rule consequentialism
does not allow me an Agent-Centered Prerogative to discontinue making sacrifices if I do
a calculation and discover that the weighted cost to myself is greater than the unweighted
cost to others generally.
If that is true, then perhaps aggregative assessment of the costs to affluent people
living in the developed world will still permit significant costs to befall those people who
accept with the ideal moral code’s requirements, even if most people do not accept the
code. But that would not be a good way to argue that rule consequentialism fails to avoid
the Demandingness Objection. Even if the cost to someone who accepts the ideal code’s
requirements becomes significant, they might be incurring those costs in an attempt to
prevent a catastrophe (about which Hooker has more to say, and which I cover in the next
section of this chapter). In general, it seems intuitive to say that preventing a catastrophe
is a good justification for a moral demand. And the Demandingness Objection was never
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appealing to our intuitions about how much cost we had to bear to prevent a moral
catastrophe from happening. The Demandingness Objection, rather, is the worry that
living a moral life will be completely incompatible with living the kind of life that I want
to lead, combined with the thought that anything worth being called the true theory of
morality ought to be compatible with living the kind of life that it would be nice for me to
lead. It is no great accomplishment to successfully argue that rule consequentialism is
demanding in situations where we must make a sacrifice in order to prevent a
catastrophe. If that is rule consequentialism’s problem, then it is not only rule
consequentialism’s problem.
A better line of argument exists, however, and this line of argument does not
depend on showing that rule consequentialism sometimes makes significant demands in
the actual world. This line of reasoning about why rule consequentialism does not avoid
the Demandingness Objection undermines one of Hooker’s key assumptions. Hooker
seems to be assuming that our intuitions about what counts as demanding under
conditions of widespread acceptance of the moral code would be stable. In other words:
in circumstances where overwhelming numbers of people accepted the ideal code
proposed by rule consequentialism, Hooker thinks that those people would count as
demanding the same things that we would count as demanding. I argue that there is no
good rationale for this conclusion. If that is true, then for all Hooker says about how rule
consequentialism is not demanding, rule consequentialism may still make demands that
we would count as demanding.
Before I proceed to that argument, we can make an observation in favor of
Hooker’s assumption. A kind of conservatism in hypothetical theorizing seems like it
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could be appropriate here, particularly as applied to the psychology of human beings in
imagined conditions. If we want to plausibly think about what would happen in
hypothetical circumstances where a certain moral code is widespread, we need to hold
fixed certain factors about human psychology, including our notion of what humans
consider highly demanding.
Still, we should be cautious of hypothetical theorizing, because our intuitions about
what the society that follows the ideal moral code would look like are probably
unreliable. For example, it is not clear that the notion of what humans consider highly
demanding refers to any kind of universally acknowledged limit on sacrifice prior to
which we think demands are permissible but after which we think demands are excessive.
Peter Singer ably points this out by quoting Thomas Aquinas on the necessity of giving
alms for the poor.75 According to Aquinas, God provides material goods in order to
satisfy human needs, and the divisions of property recommended by human law ought not
to be in conflict with the divine law regarding what is to be done with material goods.
Anyone’s having a superabundance of goods, Aquinas thinks, is preventing others from
using those same goods for the sustenance of their own needs, and thus is in conflict with
the purpose of those goods as mandated by the divine law. Perhaps Aquinas might think
it would be demanding, in some sense, for people to give away their superabundance of
goods. But any such “demanding” sacrifice would likely pale in comparison to the
importance of upholding the divine law. Naturally, Singer’s goal in quoting Aquinas is
not to say that divine law is the basis for his highly demanding results. It is, rather, to say
that his conclusions are merely out of step with a modern conception of what is morally
demanding. There is, Singer also thinks, no special reason to hold fixed the modern
75
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conception of what is demanding, especially when influential intellectual leaders in the
Western world hold very different ideas about what counts as demanding.
To give another example of obligatory charity not drawn from the Western
tradition, consider the Islamic practice of zakat. Zakat is one of the five fundamental
practices, or “pillars,” of Islam. According to this practice, a wealthy individual is
required, as part of being a faithful Muslim, to donate a minimum amount of their
material goods to charity. This practice is done, according to the American Islamic
charity Baitulmaal, for many purposes. For example, it is meant to cleanse one’s own
personality of unwholesome influences stemming from the hoarding of material goods.
Muslims see zakat as a way of combating the pernicious effects of “baser instincts of
greed, miserliness, and selfishness,” and it promotes attitudes of “generosity, love and
care, and mutual help,” both within an individual life and within and across societal
institutions and groups of people.76 But Muslim scholars do not take “wealthy individual”
to mean an extremely rich individual whose fortune runs into the millions of dollars. For
the purposes of paying zakat, a wealthy individual is one whose personal wealth amount
meets the appropriate nisab, a minimal level of wealth or its equivalent. The established
convention is that a person meets the appropriate nisab when their personal wealth
exceeds the value of three ounces of gold, an amount that Baitulmaal identifies as being
roughly $2500.77 If the person who meets the nisab is adult, sane, and a free Muslim, then
that person is required to pay zakat. Although the Qur’an does not appear to endorse a
particular percentage as the required minimum zakat,78 Islamic scholars routinely
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recommend a minimal zakat of 2.5% of one’s personal wealth in one lunar year.
Although I am no Islamic scholar, it is worth noting, finally, that the Qur’an is pretty
clear that the faithful Muslim must give zakat in the proper caring and charitable mindset;
i.e., zakat ought to be willingly paid as part of the faithful person’s duty to God,
preferably in private (Qur’an 2:271) and without a public demonstration of the zakat
payer’s generosity or any hurtful words or reticence from the zakat payer (Qur’an 2:262266).
I reference Singer’s quotation of Aquinas and the Islamic practice of zakat to
provide evidence for this claim: people who have internalized the ideal moral code may
not see abandonment of their own projects in favor of promoting the general good as a
great cost. What we consider to be unreasonable demands may seem to people living
under conditions of widespread ideal moral code acceptance to be quite reasonable.
Hooker believes that promotion of a highly demanding moral code would necessitate a
highly costly and demanding education process, consuming a very high degree of time,
energy, and resources. Naturally, that is possible. But we cannot know how education
processes might change once we have actually reached conditions of widespread ideal
moral code acceptance. Richard Arneson presses a similar point against Hooker: given
future states of technological progress, we cannot be sure that some new development
that renders moral education extremely easy and efficient, thus having a dramatic effect
on the rule selection process that rule consequentialism carries out. In such situations,
rule consequentialism would be likely to select rules that would appear very demanding
to us, but not at all demanding to future people with access to advanced technology.79
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Whether we appeal to future state of technology, as Arneson does, or we appeal as I
do to the ability of human beings, past and present, to revise their views on what is
considered demanding, the reliance on what a hypothetical society does creates epistemic
difficulties for Hooker. This is because Hooker’s rule consequentialism makes the moral
rightness of actions dependent on contingent and culturally specific facts about the
society that lives under conditions of overwhelming ideal moral code acceptance. We
simply cannot be sure that promoting widespread acceptance of the ideal code would
have the result that everyone contributes a manageable amount of their resources and no
one has to give up non-optimal projects that they care about. It seems equally possible
that the society living under those conditions might be quite happy to give up nonoptimal projects that they care about when morality requires it. Perhaps, as Singer thinks,
more morally demanding practices may be adopted as the cost of inculcating them
organically drops, much like the market price of new goods and services tends to fall over
time.
Or perhaps people living under conditions of overwhelming ideal moral code
acceptance would adopt more demanding moral codes when an effortless method of
moral teaching becomes available. Perhaps a method of directly implanting the teachings
of the most rigorously altruistic moral code known into a person’s brain becomes
available for widespread use. Call this rigorous code that I have just described the
altruistic code, and call its competitor (the previously-accepted ideal moral code) the
normal code. If this lowers the cost of the altruistic code’s acceptance enough for the
altruistic code to overtake the normal code’s maximum expected value in terms of well-

65

being, then the good rule consequentialist society would have to look favorably upon the
more-demanding altruistic code.
Hooker might object that this kind of direct moral code implantation technology,
whatever form it takes — whether it looks like the “braincaps” from Arthur C. Clarke’s
science-fiction novel 3001: The Final Odyssey, the seemingly more malicious back-ofthe-head socket familiar to us from The Matrix, or something else entirely — would be
scary and unfamiliar enough to increase the cost of the altruistic code’s inculcation, not
to decrease it, as I have suggested. It would alter the nature of a fundamental piece of
parenting and teaching, and people would be very suspicious of such a technology. That’s
a plausible objection, and I need a response. The answer is this: we do not have a
compelling reason to think that people would always react negatively to such a cultural
innovation. I must qualify this answer right away by saying that people very well may
initially react negatively, because of its unfamiliarity and the perceived threat that it poses
to standard ways of moral teaching. But given enough time, effective lobbying, and
demonstration of benefits from real-world use cases, people may very well be won over.
Why is this result problematic for Hooker? Recall that Hooker wants to use the set
of rules that, if overwhelmingly adopted by the vast majority of people, would produce
the greatest expected value as what determines moral rightness and wrongness. But a
basic difficulty in pinning down just what that set of rules is exists, because acceptance
costs — or, more simply, our notions of what we think is too demanding — are subject to
change. Hooker seems to rely on the thought that acceptance costs do not fluctuate very
much, if at all. I do not think a compelling case can be made for this point. The point of
this thought experiment is just to show that hypothetical conditions, like conditions of
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overwhelming ideal moral code acceptance, are far removed enough from the actual
world that our intuitions about this case are probably not reliable. We do not know what
kinds of technological advances might make altruistic moral teachings more popular and
effective, or how even relatively modest cultural projects (like Singer’s anti-poverty
program) might lead people to view what we would currently consider to be the very
demanding option as less of a sacrifice. If all that is plausible, then the upshot is that for
all Hooker has claimed about the moderation of rule consequentialism, it might still
recommend something that we would take to be very demanding.

4. Rule Consequentialism and Polluter’s Dilemmas
I want to consider, in this section, whether Hooker’s rule consequentialism fares
better when we consider Many-Person Dilemmas that involve small harms that
accumulate over time and result in very large harms. In other words, I wish to investigate
whether rule consequentialism is subject to the Polluter’s Dilemma, which I developed in
the previous chapter. I shall claim that rule consequentialism does not fare well in this
regard. Before I proceed to argue for this claim, I want to take into account two more
aspects of Hooker’s formulation of rule consequentialism that are important.
One aspect requires me to be careful in formulating my objection. Hooker claims
that much of rule consequentialism is amenable to reformulation so as to include
protections for the environment. He does not elaborate, however, on what such
reformulations might look like, but he is reasonably confident that such reformulations
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can be made.80 We can make some attempt to discern what rules rule consequentialism
would recommend, and I will attempt to do so below.
Another aspect of rule consequentialism worth mentioning here is that it would
endorse a rule that enjoins us to prevent disasters. Ordinarily, rule consequentialism does
not allow deviation from rules, such as “avoid lying,” when doing so might allow us to
gain a little extra utility on the side. Similarly, it does not recommend fine-grained
exceptions to rules, even when such exceptions are apt to generate more utility. This
feature of rule consequentialism, Hooker argues, enables him to avoid the Collapse
Objection to rule consequentialism. This objection, roughly sketched, holds that rule
consequentialism is extensionally equivalent to act consequentialism, but weaker because
of its added theoretical machinery, including the indirect assessment of acts via its
assessment of rules. Hooker, resisting the Collapse Objection (plausibly, in my view),
writes:
How much confidence would you have in others if you knew they accepted such
highly qualified rules? Mackie…observed, ‘We are rightly sceptical about a man of
principle who has a new principle for every case.’ The same is true about someone
who has too many exception clauses.81

So there is some reason to think that accepting such a highly complex set of rules would
not engender trust regarding other people in us. Hooker resists the Collapse Objection
further, stating that there is more reason to suppose that rule consequentialism would not
accept a code of rules with so many epicycles. It would mean a higher cost of
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internalization. A better code of rules, Hooker thinks, would be the set that is limited in
number and complexity.82
But rule consequentialism will allow deviation from rules sometimes. Plausibly, I
might not want to insist on scrupulously observing the “avoid lying” rule when an act of
lying to the secret police might enable me to save the lives of innocent refugees I am
hiding in my basement. Thus, Hooker argues that the ideal code of rules will include a
rule that tells us to prevent disasters, and this rule will have the authority to override other
rules in the ideal code.83 Most obviously, the rule would apply to situations where we can
prevent imminent, acute disasters, such as the drowning of a child. It would be better, all
things considered, to break my promise to always get to work on time and save a
drowning child rather than diligently follow the rule “keep the promises that you make.”
Taken together, these two aspects of rule consequentialism can generate rules that,
at least at first glance, render it better prepared to face the challenge of the Polluter’s
Dilemma. Rule consequentialism would recommend that we act according to rules that
require us to prevent disaster. Presumably, this recommendation would include
preventing environmental disasters. It does not allow agents to prefer their own nonoptimal projects at the expense of the general good. And it does not allow agents to defect
from a cooperative project to gain a little extra utility for themselves when the
opportunity presents itself. So it would, we are let to believe, prevent disasters related to
climate change.
I argue that this appearance is mistaken. Hooker’s rule consequentialism is subject
to a dilemma. On one horn of the dilemma, rule consequentialism is directly collectively
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self-defeating.84 On the other horn of the dilemma, rule consequentialism endorses a set
of rules with extremely high acceptance and maintenance costs that will alienate people
from their projects and demand more of them than we might ordinarily have thought that
morality demanded. And this endorsement may be necessary in the actual world.
The “prevent disaster” rule will not allow the society that accepts the ideal code to
prevent the generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas. The “prevent disaster” rule seems
designed, as I suggested above, to prevent imminent, acute disasters. Polluter’s Dilemmas
are not disasters of this type. Polluter’s Dilemmas are generated by repeated instances of
the same type of action, each involving a diffuse harm that, considered on its own, is
negligible in its effect. But the repeated instances of the harm accumulate over time, and
eventually a very great harm that applies to all individuals within the relevant ecosystem
is generated by the accumulation of small harms. Polluter’s Dilemmas are disasters that
are slow to occur and that inflict their great general harm over a long period of time,
instead of being a disaster that occurs all at once and that might be prevented by an
immediate action licensed by the “prevent disaster” rule. To prevent the generation of
Polluter’s Dilemmas, there would need to be a rule in the ideal code that prevents us from
creating the sort of small, accumulating harms that generate the Polluter’s Dilemma. But
such a rule, by Hooker’s stipulation, is unlikely to be included in the ideal code. This rule
would, at the very least, require us to think far more carefully about whether the benefit
we derive from each individual car trip is worth the harm to the environment that the car
trip involves, for example. It may require us to be far more scrupulous about taking care
to properly dispose of waste and conserve water. This rule would be difficult to
internalize and costly to maintain. People in wealthy Western nations are quite used to
84
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being able to go to whatever places they wish, when they wish, if they have enough gas
in their fuel tank. And they do so for many reasons, some of them worthwhile (a
commute to their job, for example), but many of them unnecessary. A rule that abrogated
this privilege would be difficult to accept. Remember Hooker’s move to acceptance rule
consequentialism. A rule that is likely to involve extremely high acceptance and
maintenance costs is not a likely candidate for inclusion in the ideal code. In particular, a
rule designed to prevent the generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas would be far-reaching
enough that it would undoubtedly greatly affect the total cost of acceptance and
maintenance of the ideal moral code. Rule consequentialism would thus reject such a rule
as too demanding. But perhaps rule consequentialism’s “prevent disaster” rule would
enable the society living under the ideal moral code to maintain a consequentially optimal
level of pollution: more restriction and the code becomes too stringent to maintain, to say
nothing of its dampening effects on economic activity; less restriction and the pain from
climate change becomes too acute for us to readily adapt to. Suppose us to have such a
story about how we go about generating this consequentially optimal level of pollution.
It is too optimistic, however, to suggest that rule consequentialism can ultimately
avoid generating Polluter’s Dilemmas while at the same time avoiding the
Demandingness Objection. The point is this: no individual car trip is a disaster. The harm
produced by a single car trip is negligible. It is only in the accumulation of these
individually negligible harms that the harm of pollution reaches disaster proportions.85 So
there does not seem like any principled way for a rule consequentialist to apply the
“prevent disaster” rule in a society where people are used to the freedom of movement
85
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that cars provide them. But let us suppose for a moment that our supercomputers which
model the effects of pollution on the environment tell us that, sometime in the next week,
our industrial and commercial activity will cause us to reach a “tipping point” in the
process of climate change, such that reaching this tipping point will put us far enough
above the consequentially optimal level of pollution to cause the process of climate
change to accelerate beyond our capacity to adapt to it quickly enough. It’s unclear, as I
have just argued, whether there is a principled rule consequentialist rationale for applying
the “prevent disaster” rule in an effective way in “tipping-point” circumstances. But let us
suppose that we ignore this problem and apply the “prevent disaster” rule effectively. We
do so, out of necessity, on a very widespread basis, and so many ordinary rules are
overridden. Non-essential car travel is heavily restricted, as is air transportation. Polluting
industry is curtailed, including the generation of electrical power at coal-fired power
plants. Economic activity suffers heavily. This is an extremely demanding result. And this
demanding result may not just be in a possible world that has reached a climate tipping
point. This may be the situation in the actual world. The scientific consensus has it that
our world is either very near to, or has recently passed, a tipping point of this sort. If it is
the situation in the actual world, Hooker’s rule consequentialism must either endorse an
extremely demanding result in the actual world, thus rendering it unable to avoid the
Demandingness Objection, or it must permit the generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas, in
which case it is directly collectively self-defeating.
Before I conclude, let me consider an objection to this line of argument. The
objection is this: a general directive enjoining us to be prudent is likely to be included in
the ideal moral code. It is part of conventional morality, and it is furthermore a rule that
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has high payoff in terms of expected well-being and low inculcation costs. Even though
people sometimes have difficulty being prudent, inculcating a general practice of
prudence is not very demanding because prudence appeals to an agent’s self-interest. The
cases I have pointed to in developing the Polluter’s Dilemma could be headed off by a
general rule of being prudent. Prudence might make significant demands in some
circumstances, but those demands are always to my benefit. And if those demands are
always to my benefit, then they cannot be the all-consuming, alienating kind of demands
that motivate Bernard Williams’s excellent formulation of the Demandingness
Objection.86 So I have failed to come up with a case demonstrating that Hooker has not
avoided the Demandingness Objection.
This objection cannot shield Hooker entirely from the force of the Polluter’s
Dilemma. It may be prudent for the current generation to work together to avoid the
consequences to us of global climate change. But if that is how we understand prudence,
then prudence has nothing to say about why we ought to prevent a future disaster that
would not affect us at all. Let us stipulate, in the thought experiment involving a
consequentially optimal level of pollution given above, that the disasters resulting from
the runaway effects of climate change shall not take effect until every currently living
person is dead. In the very moment after the last currently living person dies, however,
global climate change will begin to take its toll. In this situation, appeals to prudence will
have no weight; no one’s interests will be affected negatively due to climate change. But
there will be future generations, and we will be in a position to prevent a disaster for them
by regulating our own behavior and our collective appetite. So the “prevent disaster” rule
will still be in effect, and will govern many actions that we take that have important
86
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implications for future generations. Thus, rule consequentialism may require me to give
up projects that I care about, and for reasons that have nothing to do with my own selfinterest.87
I conclude that there is no reason to suppose that rule consequentialism successfully
escapes the Demandingness Objection. Generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas is clearly
unacceptable. And yet there is a very real danger that rule consequentialism will either
generate Polluter’s Dilemmas, or assign just the kind of alienating demands that the
friend of the Demandingness Objection always thought was unacceptable.
Joseph Mendola observes, along with Derek Parfit, that common-sense morality
probably is not suitable for the technologically advanced age we find ourselves in.88 This
is an acute problem for rule consequentialism, as it seeks to hew very closely to commonsense morality, even to the point where closeness to common-sense morality is the tiebreaker between ideal-code candidates. Coherence with common-sense morality is
obviously important to some degree, and morality had better deliver familiar and
expected results, such as the wrongness of murder, theft, and rape. But closeness to
common-sense morality is clearly deficient when we consider large, nasty problems such
as climate change. So much the worse for moral theories that attempt to stick close to
common-sense morality.
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Chapter 3: The Inconsistency of the Collective Principle

1. The Collective Principle and the Compliance Condition
There are several kinds of tactics that a philosopher interested in defending a
version of consequentialism from the Demandingness Objection might use. Some of
these tactics we have discussed already; namely, the Agent-Centered Prerogative and the
reliance on intuitions about the cost of accepting and maintaining a principle of
beneficence. In this chapter, I want to consider a third attempt to moderate
consequentialism’s demands enough to overcome the Demandingness Objection; that of
replacing consequentialism’s standard optimizing principle of beneficence with a
principle of beneficence that incorporates the concept of a fair share of doing good that
an agent is required to do. This is Liam Murphy’s view. Murphy has done much in recent
years to bring into focus issues of fairness in how consequentialism distributes demands
among agents. His goal is to propose and defend what he believes is the most plausible
candidate for a principle of beneficence: one that incorporates the concept of fairness.89
In what follows, I present two arguments against Murphy’s view. First, I argue that
Murphy’s view has been moderated so much that it will regularly fail to make
appropriate, plausible demands of agents. Second, I argue that Murphy’s version of
moderate consequentialism cannot escape the Demandingness Objection in the actual
world, because it recommends that each agent’s fair share of responding to the problem
of global climate change is extremely high. In the final section of this chapter, I explore a
89
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modification to Murphy’s view that can enable him to avoid both objections.
Murphy’s perspective on beneficence represents a departure from the standard act
consequentialist conception of beneficence. Whereas the act consequentialist sees
beneficence as a project for us to individually engage in, Murphy thinks it is better to see
beneficence as “a shared cooperative aim….Each of us does not, strictly speaking, aim to
promote the good. Each sees himself as working with others to promote the good.”90 Such
a thought is appealing enough, of course. Suppose that an ordinary middle-class citizen of
a wealthy nation acted on Peter Singer’s moderate principle of beneficence and donated
to an effective famine relief effort up to the point where she would have needed to give
up something of moral significance to donate further.91 Although it is a large donation
considered on its own, such a donation does not go very far. Upon realizing this, our
donor might be filled with pessimism upon considering act consequentialism’s individual
requirement to maximize the good. At that point, our hypothetical agent would realize
that a single charitable donation, despite it being a very large donation, and thus, a
maximization of the good, her donation will not have done much to solve such an
overwhelming problem. What might make the donor less pessimistic is the realization
that every little bit does help, because she is part of a collective project to provide relief.
This thought experiment, if plausible, shows that there is at least some reason to think
that adopting a more moderate, collectively-distributed take on the requirements of
beneficence might actually produce better consequences in the long run. If I think that all
I need to do is my fair share of what needs to be done, and my fair share is manageable, I
will be much more willing to do my part than if I am faced with a seemingly unlimited
90
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demand that I promote the good wherever I am able in the course of solving an enormous
problem.
With this departure from the standard consequentialist conception of beneficence,
Murphy claims that the traditional principle of beneficence, embraced by the classical
utilitarians and act consequentialists, is not the most plausible candidate for a principle of
beneficence. This traditional principle he refers to as the Optimizing Principle. The
Optimizing Principle’s content is familiar. It holds that we are always required to act in
the way that produces the greatest overall benefit. Murphy believes, however, that the
Optimizing Principle is indefensible because of its unfairness to agents who comply with
its demands.
What does this unfairness consist in? By now, most people are well aware that there
are millions of desperately poor and needy people all over the world. Most people are
also aware that numerous charities exist which work to alleviate the conditions of the
desperately poor, and have had much success in doing so. And finally, most people
recognize the fact that their contribution could help alleviate starvation, disease, or death.
Recognizing this, some donate their time and/or money to charities. But these people,
sadly, are most likely in the minority. While it seems plausible that most people have
donated money to charity or volunteered for a charitable cause at some point, most
people do not sacrifice a significant portion of their income for charitable purposes.
Those people who are charitable donators know this. If their operative moral principle is
the Optimizing Principle, then it seems like they are morally required to sacrifice as much
of their time, energy, and resources as possible, at least up to the point where the
charitable donator would be sacrificing something of moral significance (perhaps, for
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example, her ability to pay for her own housing). This is because the most optimal action,
under such non-ideal conditions, would be for the charitable donors to give as much of
their own resources as possible so as to make up for the lack of compliance from the nondonors.
Murphy argues that this reveals the unfairness of the Optimizing Principle; it places
disproportionate burdens on those who actually decide to comply with the demands of
morality, so conceived. The donors, he suggests, might ask why they have to take on the
additional burden of making up for the moral wrongdoings of others.92 It would be unfair
to require me, he argues, to make up for the wrongdoings of others; this would allow
others to exploit me.
It is for this reason that Murphy argues for the rejection of the Optimizing
Principle, and the adoption of his Collective Principle of Beneficence. The Collective
Principle, roughly stated, holds that we are required to perform the action that could
reasonably be expected to produce the greatest overall benefit. We are only required to
sacrifice, however, to the extent that we would be required to sacrifice under full
compliance; that is, if everyone was complying with the demands of morality. Murphy’s
statement of the Collective Principle runs as follows:
Everyone is required to perform one of the actions that, of those available to her, is
optimal in respect of expected aggregate weighted well-being, except in situations
of partial compliance with this principle. In situations of partial compliance, a
person’s maximum level of required sacrifice is that which will reduce her level of
expected well-being to the level it would be, all other aspects of her situation
remaining the same, if there were to be full compliance from that point on. Under
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partial compliance a person is required to perform either an action, of those
requiring no more than the maximum level of required sacrifice, that is optimal in
respect of expected weighted aggregate well-being, or any other action which is at
least as good in respect of expected weighted aggregate well-being.
However, no one is required to act in a way that imposes a loss on some
other person unless that other persons’ expected level of well-being after the loss
would be at least as high as it would be, all other aspects of the situation remaining
the same, under full compliance from that point on.93

Note that the crucial component of the Collective Principle is what Murphy has
called the Compliance Condition. The Compliance Condition may be stated thus:
If other agents cease to comply with the demands of a principle of beneficence, an
acceptable principle of beneficence will not increase its demands on agents who do
comply with that principle.94

Thus, if I am a member of a group which is collectively engaged in a beneficent project,
such as providing aid to the victims of a natural disaster, the Compliance Condition
protects me from being exploited in the unhappy circumstance where other members of
the group defect from the beneficent project, whatever it is, and I am left to pick up the
slack.
The way the Compliance Condition and the Collective Principle work together
would look something like the following situation. Suppose that an earthquake has
caused exactly one hundred billion dollars in damage to a city in a foreign country, and I
93
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am a citizen of a country untouched by this disaster. These two nations -- my country and
the foreign country -- are the only two nations in the world. The earthquake has destroyed
the headquarters of the foreign country’s stock exchange and major banks, so none of the
foreign country’s citizens can make relief donations within their own country. My fellow
citizens and I think that it is morally obligatory to provide emergency aid to those living
in the disaster zone, but as it happens a recent economic crisis is preventing the
government from being able to do much but attend to its budget woes. That being the
case, we citizens shall need to take matters into our own hands by figuring out just what
our individual obligations are. Suppose now that my country has one hundred million
citizens able to give aid. Full compliance with the Collective Principle would generate a
grassroots, nationwide disaster relief program, such that every one of my country’s
citizens would give one thousand dollars to the stricken foreign country. But not
everyone donates money to the relief effort. The Compliance Condition, however,
prevents me from being morally required to donate any more than one thousand dollars in
aid, since that is what my duty would be under conditions of full compliance. I would
thus not be made to sacrifice more when non-cooperative agents sacrifice less. It is their
moral responsibility to donate more, and we would be able to hold those non-cooperative
agents morally accountable for their lack of willingness to donate.

2. Does the Collective Principle Fairly Evaluate Rescue Cases?
Toward the end of his Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, Murphy attempts to
address James Rachels’ two-rescuer case.95 Rachels says that this shows “the fallacy of
95
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supposing that one’s duty is only to do one’s fair share […].”96 The two-rescuer case
proceeds as follows. Suppose you and a perfect stranger are walking alongside a pond,
and you come across two children drowning in a pond. Obviously, each person’s fair
share under conditions of full compliance with the Collective Principle is to save one
child apiece. You wade in and do your fair share, saving one child. But the stranger
simply walks away. Are you required to save the remaining child?
Murphy’s answer is complex. Obviously, the Collective Principle does not directly
require me to save the remaining child, because to require me to wade back into the pond
would be to require me to do more than my fair share, and that would violate the
Compliance Condition. There is no question that I would be permitted to save the
remaining child; agents would always be permitted to sacrifice further if they wished to
do so. But that is not the point. It is our goal to figure out exactly what the Collective
Principle requires us to do in this situation. And the answer that Murphy gives on this
question seems to be that it depends on the situation whether the Collective Principle
gives the “right” answer in this case.97 By “the right answer,” I mean that you would be
required to wade back in to the pond to save the other child, even though you have done
your fair share.98 Murphy says that it follows that a certain level of sacrifice would be
required of us in such a two-rescuer case. But it does not follow directly that I should
wade back into the pond. The Collective Principle, he writes, will not treat needs
generated by emergencies differently than other cases of required beneficence. It is
simply a matter of where applying my required level of sacrifice would do the most
96

For Murphy’s response to Rachels, see Murphy 2000, 127-133.
Ibid., 128.
98
Regular posing of this dilemma to undergraduates in introductory ethics courses seems to support this
assumption. I admit, however, that this is anecdotal evidence.
97

81

good.99 Here, the Collective Principle may come up with the right answer. For consider
how much good I would be doing by hauling another child out of the pond. In exchange
for the low cost of spending a few more seconds in the water and getting my alreadymuddy shoes and pants even dirtier, the payoff of saving a life seems for all the world
like a cost-effective sacrifice. Consequently, the collective principle of beneficence,
Murphy claims, may support a rule of thumb that requires you to perform rescues if the
cost of doing so is very low; furthermore, it may increase overall well-being if we
cultivate dispositions to perform rescues when they are needed.
But sometimes, the Collective Principle will give the “wrong” answer in a rescue
case. Murphy’s example here is a case in which some astronomers have been planning
for years an important and expensive experiment, which must be conducted at sea on a
specific night. At the requisite time and place, the astronomers get a distress call from a
sinking ship that is many miles away. The astronomers could abandon their experiment
and set course for the sinking ship to rescue that ship’s crew. But if they abandon their
experiment and steam to the rescue, they will lose forever their chance to conduct their
experiment. Moreover, if they abandon their experiment, all the money spent in
preparation for that experiment would be wasted, leaving not only the astronomers
themselves but also the government agencies, private donors, and private research
companies worse off, for they would have nothing to show for all the money spent. The
Collective Principle, as stated in the previous section, does not require the astronomers to
perform the rescue, for doing so would require the astronomers to both impose a loss on
those agencies, companies, and donors and be unable to compensate them enough to
make up for the loss. In other words, it violates what Murphy refers to as the Third99
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Person Rider.100 What the astronomers might be required to do is figure out what level of
sacrifice they might have needed to make to carry out the rescue, and factor that in to
their general duty of beneficence required by the Collective Principle. They would, in
other words, have to make a donation “in memory of those lost at sea.” But it would be
permissible to let the sailors drown.
This makes a hard kind of sense. At some point, heroic rescue efforts, whatever the
situation, become fruitless and too costly to continue. Doctors sometimes cease
resuscitation efforts when continuing could save a life. Searches for missing hikers or for
missing persons buried in disaster debris are called off eventually, even when it is
theoretically possible that the unfortunate ones might yet continue to live. Common sense
might seem to adhere to an unlimited duty of rescue at times, but that is not necessarily a
point in favor of common sense. Murphy’s argument that not all rescues are cheap or
easy, and therefore a highly demanding duty of rescue might force the rescuer to exceed
his fair share of sacrifice, may go some way toward alleviating the demandingness of the
need to perform rescues.
But those who hold that the Demandingness Objection has some force could object
that Murphy has failed to show that his account spreads the demands of morality evenly.
For example, Murphy admits that extremely destitute people are not required to perform a
rescue at all, even if it is quite easy to do. This is because they have so little to sacrifice
that any level of sacrifice might exceed their fair share.101 But surely, Murphy’s critic
might say, even a very poor and destitute person could be expected to wade into the pond
and save the drowning child.
100
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Consider the following case. Suppose you are homeless, and have only a single
dollar in change in your pocket and the clothes you are wearing as resources. You
typically reside at a homeless shelter at a church, but in your daily wanderings you have
crossed to the other side of town, relative to the shelter. Suppose then that you come
across another homeless person, who has been walking for some time toward this shelter
from a town many miles away. This person is extremely tired and has not had a meal in
several days. He has eighty cents, just twenty cents too few to buy a package of trail mix
from a vending machine, and he asks you if you could give him twenty cents. You have
twenty cents, and you conclude from his appearance that he will probably collapse and
die from starvation if he does not have this package of trail mix right away.
Given what Murphy has said, the Collective Principle seems to not require you to
give this other homeless person twenty cents. But why is that? The Collective Principle,
all other things being equal, essentially says that the maximum level of sacrifice is
equivalent to the total amount of good to be done divided by the number of agents
available to produce the good. Since the total amount of good to be done is equivalent to
twenty cents in this case, and you are the only agent available to do the good, it follows
that you are required to give twenty cents. It isn’t clear why you wouldn’t be required to
give twenty cents in this case. Even if twenty cents is equivalent to twenty percent of
one’s total financial resources, twenty cents is still a relatively negligible amount of
money because its purchasing power is so low. If you lived in a nation where the
purchasing power of twenty cents was very high, then to demand a twenty-cent sacrifice
from you would perhaps seem extreme. But the impact of twenty cents upon you in this
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situation is negligible, and your sacrifice could save a life. A strict emphasis on fairness
here thus does not seem appropriate.
What seems more appropriate to consider is the position you are in are to bring
about something good, and how efficiently you could produce that good. In this case, you
are uniquely situation to bring about some good, and because of the relative purchasing
power of twenty cents, you are also in a position to efficiently bring about that good. That
is to say, a relatively small sacrifice on your part would bring about a great deal of good.
We would say the same of Superman, who can very easily rescue a great many people.
Superman, with his incredible abilities, is uniquely situated to bring about a great deal of
good, and has the ability to efficiently bring about that good. He could easily perform
rescues and bring about good far beyond his fair share, as Murphy would understand that
notion.
Imagine, for a moment, that Superman tells us that he is not morally required to
save any more people today because he has done his fair share of good. Metropolis is
threatened by numerous calamities, and Superman has done his part to save the people of
Metropolis. But the rest of the Justice League, uncharacteristically, has declined to do
their part. Superman is not interested in picking up the slack, though he could easily do
so. Intuitively, our reaction would be puzzlement. What explains this puzzlement? Just
the considerations I have listed. I suggest that one’s fair share is not determined simply
by the amount of good to be done divided by the number of agents available to produce
the good. One’s fair share is also determined, although perhaps not completely, by how
well someone is situated to do good, and how easily they could pull off their contribution
to the good. Although it is unfair, in Murphy’s sense, for us to ask Superman to pick up
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the slack from the rest of the Justice League, I suggest that it does not disrespect common
sense for us to ask for more sacrifice from Superman on this point. It would be fair to ask
this of him, we think, just because he is so uniquely situated to do good and so efficient at
bringing it about. For the same reasons, the general public would be correct to castigate
me if I were to refuse to save the second child in Rachels’ two-rescuer case.
Murphy thinks that our disgust with you, should we find out that you allowed
someone else to suffer because you think that saving him or her would have violated the
Compliance Condition, consists in not wanting to have anything to do with you rather
than an especially strong judgment of wrongdoing.102 That holds true, it seems, whether
you are the rescuer in Rachels’ case who has already complied with morality and refuses
to save the second child, or the unwilling Superman, or a homeless person with a dollar in
change. I do not believe Murphy’s result is correct. We can criticize you for having an
incomplete understanding of what fairness consists in. Your wrongdoing in the situation
of the homeless person, for example, stems from not taking important contingent facts
into account, namely the difference between the good that the twenty cents would do you
and the good that the twenty cents would do the other homeless person. It also stems
from not incorporating that contingent information into an assessment of how efficiently
you could perform the good to be done. Now, Murphy’s Collective Principle requires you
to know a lot of contingent information before you can know what your fair share is; it
requires you to know, for example, how much good needs to be done and how many
people are available to do the good. But there is more to determining a fair share than
that. In this case, you have failed to be fair in appraising how much twenty cents is worth
to you and your homeless counterpart, respectively. You have thus failed to be
102
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completely impartial in your judgment about where the place is that your resources would
do the most good. And that means you have failed to fully capture the concept of fairness
in how your moral theory assigns demands. Having a fair principle of beneficence isn’t
just a matter of having a principle that allows one to figure out fair shares. A fully fair
principle of beneficence will need to take into account contingent information like who is
uniquely situated to produce the good and how efficient they are at producing that good.
That principle of beneficence would respect our common-sense notion that greater
obligation to do good goes along with greater ability to do good. It seems perverse to
consider just what your fair share, as Murphy understands that notion, might be in
situation like this. This is true not just because we watch what you do and make a
negative judgment about your character.
Up to this point, I have been concerned with what the Collective Principle requires
of a destitute person. Even if my result in this discussion is correct, one might think that
this was a case of going after low-hanging fruit. My case might cause trouble for
Murphy, but the trouble I have caused so far is trouble on the fringes. It’s not clear why
demands morality might make of a destitute person are important when the paradigm
case of a person that the Demandingness Objection seeks to defend from the
overwhelming demands of consequentialism is an affluent person seeking to not be
alienated from the kinds of projects and pursuits that we might have thought a moral life
contained room for.
I think, however, that what we have learned from considering the case of what
demands might be appropriate for a destitute person can be generalized from the case of a
homeless person to the case of an affluent middle-class citizen of a developed nation.
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Suppose that we select any member of the class of affluent middle-class citizens in
developed nations. Suppose further that whatever the required fair share that Murphy’s
Collective Principle generates for her is, she has complied with it. Let’s stipulate that ten
percent of her money has gone to effective charitable organizations that relieve acute
suffering and famine in war-torn, far-flung places. In every sense, she has effectively and
faithfully followed through on her moral obligations, as Murphy understands them. Now
she is out for a walk and comes across a starved homeless person seeking twenty cents to
buy a bag of trail mix from a vending machine. As before, the appearance of this
homeless person suggests that he will collapse and die of starvation if he does not have a
bag of trail mix immediately. But our affluent citizen, having some leisure time to read
philosophy, knows that the Collective Principle says that she has met her moral
obligations to alleviate famine in the world and that she is not required to give a single
cent more, much less twenty more. So she walks away, and allows the homeless person to
die of starvation. Whatever Murphy says about the necessity of having a solid motive to
render help in cases of extreme need, the Collective Principle does not require our
affluent citizen to render aid in this case. This is, I think, a reductio ad absurdum on the
Collective Principle.
It does matter whether our affluent citizen in this case is uniquely situated to bring
about the good, and how efficient she is at bringing it about. As I argued previously,
fairness in being beneficent is not just a matter of knowing our fair shares, abstractly
considered. Knowing how uniquely situated we are to do the good, and how efficiently
we are able to do the good, is important for us to figuring out what a fair demand on us is.
If our affluent citizen here is not uniquely situated to bring about the good, then her
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wrongdoing is greatly reduced. Perhaps other people are nearby, and they have not done
their fair share of alleviating poverty and homelessness. If she refuses to give twenty
cents, she has still done something wrong, because she would be at least as efficiently as
any of the other affluent onlookers at bringing about the good. If, however, she is not as
efficient as some of the onlookers would be at bringing about the good, then she is
absolved of wrongdoing. If a reduction in her financial resources of twenty cents leaves
her unable to afford shelter for herself, for example, then she would not be efficient at
bringing about the good to be done. Then we could excuse her for asking one of the
onlookers to start doing their fair share.
What if our affluent citizen was uniquely situated to save the homeless person’s life
but was not efficient at bringing that about? Suppose now that there are no onlookers, but
giving twenty cents would leave her unable to afford shelter for herself. It would, I think,
still be wrong if she were to refuse to give twenty cents. The loss of a life seems
weightier than a temporary inability to pay a bill. It would, moreover, not be much of a
burden on someone else if our affluent citizen were to ask for assistance totaling twenty
cents so that she could pay her bill.
Keith Horton has recently come to a similar conclusion when assessing Murphy’s
view about what fairness consists in.103 He argues that considerations of fairness are
stronger in some contexts and weaker in others, depending on how strong opposing
factors are (such as when a life is at stake). I agree with Horton’s assessment, but I think
we can say more about why the Collective Principle has failed to produce an acceptable
answer in what Horton calls “low-cost-high-benefit cases.” The Collective Principle
permits this absurd result because it is concerned only with what one’s fair share is,
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abstractly considered. It would not permit this result if it required us to fairly evaluate the
benefit to an affluent citizen holding on to their resources against the benefit to a destitute
person of an affluent citizen making a sacrifice of their resources and make decisions on
that basis. That, for Murphy, might be a step too far in the direction of the Optimizing
Principle. But it’s possible that such a modification might be keeping in the original spirit
of the Collective Principle, as the modification attempts to flesh out the concept of
fairness that Murphy is relying upon.
As we have seen, the Collective Principle has been moderated so much that it will
regularly fail to make appropriate, plausible demands. A modification to the Compliance
Condition may make things better for Murphy. I will consider this modification in a
subsequent section of this chapter. But this is not the only trouble that the Collective
Principle faces.

3. Mulgan’s Wrong Facts Objection and the Problems of Global Climate Change
Tim Mulgan has forcefully objected to Murphy’s Collective Principle in the hopes
of showing that all forms of Collective Consequentialism are unacceptable.104 One of his
arguments that he wields against Murphy is called the Wrong Facts Objection. The
objection, roughly sketched, is that in using the Collective Principle to decide what to do
in a given situation, I base my conclusion too much upon contingent facts about that
situation. These contingent facts affect the extent of my obligation very strongly.
Consider the following version of the Wrong Facts Objection. Suppose that an affluent
citizen of the developed world is prepared to do her fair share, but does not know how
104
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much is required of her. She only knows that she is one of three possible situations. In
situation A, there are only one million people living in famine conditions. In situation B,
there are fifty million people living in famine conditions. And finally, in situation C, there
are 2.5 billion people living in famine conditions.
Mulgan stipulates that situation B is the actual world and that full compliance with
the Collective Principle would require a donation of ten percent of the affluent citizen’s
income. When we examine what happens in situations A and C, however, we notice that
our affluent citizen’s fair share varies wildly. Decreasing the amount of starving people in
the world by a factor of fifty, as in situation A, reduces our affluent citizen’s fair share to
a fifth of one percent of her income. Increasing the amount of starving people in the
world by a factor of fifty, as in situation C, increases our affluent citizen’s fair share to
five hundred percent of her income. Since this obviously could not be sustained in
practice, we should simply say that she is required to give all of her income away to
charity.
Mulgan’s objection to the results that the Collective Principle generates is that the
large difference between the sizes of the fair shares is unreasonable. Why is this so? He
thinks that the Collective Principle is responding merely to two facts: how much aid
needs to be given, and how many people are available to produce that aid. But it
generates odd results in two ways. Dramatically reducing the amount of good that needs
to be done generates the result that our affluent citizen is required to sacrifice a relative
pittance to the cause of famine relief, even when she understands that compliance with
morality, as Murphy conceives of it, is not going to reach an ideal level because some of
her fellow citizens are not going to donate. The facts that would be right for a principle of
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beneficence to respond to, Mulgan says, is where her contribution would do the most
good and about how much good she would be able to do.
Mulgan’s objection is not very persuasive in situation A. If one is interested in
promoting a culture that values the virtues of giving, generosity, and going above and
beyond the call of duty, as Murphy does, it just isn’t clear why we should object to
someone trying to figure out what the fair share of everyone able to donate to charity is.
If we figure out that everyone’s fair share is relatively small and manageable, as it is in
Mulgan’s situation A, then it would be quite a bit easier to convince everyone that they
ought to be donating to charity, and quite a bit easier to sound reasonable when (gently)
castigating someone for failing to live up to their obligation.
But Mulgan’s situation C is very problematic indeed. It suggests that if the size of
the good that needs to be done is great enough, Murphy will be unable to avoid the
Demandingness Objection. Perhaps it is unrealistic to suppose that situation C is anything
like the real world. There are parts of the world that are in famine conditions, to be sure,
but to have roughly every third person in the world starving would be an unheard-of
disaster.
Unfortunately for us, there is a problem in the actual world on the scale of situation
C. The effects of global climate change cannot be said to be a single unified natural
disaster, such as in the case of situation C’s world-historic famine. But there is no
denying that the multitude of global climate change’s effects -- including sea level rises,
extreme temperatures, desertification, and increased drought and storm frequency, as well
as their secondary effects, which include widespread food shortages, water crises,
infectious disease outbreaks, and displacements of entire populations, -- makes it a
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phenomenon on the scale of situation C’s famine. It is, as Dale Jamieson has said in a
recent paper, “the world’s biggest collective action problem.”105
What would Murphy’s Collective Principle require that we do about the harms of
climate change that await us in the future? Recall what the Collective Principle says
about situations of partial compliance:
In situations of partial compliance, a person’s maximum level of required sacrifice
is that which will reduce her level of expected well-being to the level it would be,
all other aspects of her situation remaining the same, if there were to be full
compliance from that point on.106

We are currently, I suggest, in a situation of partial compliance. Our collective
failure to act optimally has generated the greenhouse gases necessary for the process of
global climate change and its attendant effects to come about. In that case, Murphy’s
principle says that we shall need to assume that everybody complies with the Collective
Principle from this point forward. In other words, everyone shall be required to act so that
no future climate-related disaster is any further abetted than it already is by human action.
A moment’s reflection on the extent to which our daily behaviors abet the process of
climate change should illustrate the far-reaching nature of this result. To be sure, an
immediate and radical change such as the Collective Principle would appear to require in
our case may not be practical. Still, the recommendation is clear enough: given our
current ecological situation, the Collective Principle recommends a drastic change to our
daily habits, diets, methods of transportation, trade regulation, and level of support for
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ecologically sound technologies. Furthermore, future disasters produced by the process of
climate change would require a worldwide disaster relief response from everyone
unaffected by the disaster. These future disasters are not the result of any future person’s
partial compliance; thus, future persons would have to ready themselves to do their fair
share of work to alleviate suffering from these disasters.
This is an extremely demanding result, and it can be derived directly from
Murphy’s Collective Principle plus some plausible assumptions about what conditions in
the actual world are like. The Collective Principle thus fails to avoid the Demandingness
Objection; there is no question that the Collective Principle, in the actual world, would
alienate us from many of the projects and pursuits that we might have thought a moral
life was compatible with.
One might be tempted to reply that my just-reached conclusion is not an effective
objection against the Collective Principle. All I may have demonstrated here is that
prudence, not the Collective Principle, can turn out to be extremely demanding. It is not,
therefore, clear that the Collective Principle has fallen to the Objection. The point may be
illustrated as follows:
The Selfish Will Suffer. Unless everyone adopts a very demanding, altruistic system
of morality, everyone’s immortal soul will be sent to a realm of anguish and torture
for all eternity after their physical death. Suppose, furthermore, that we have
indubitable, independently verifiable proof that this is the case: we have all heard a
booming voice from the sky proclaiming the moral law, and the Gateway to the
Underworld is a real, physical object from which one can easily hear the pitiful
cries of the deceased selfish if one stands near enough.
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In this case, whatever non-prudential reasons we have for being altruistic, we have a very
excellent prudential reason to observe a highly demanding morality. The same is true in
the case of climate change. If we want to avoid the worst effects of climate change, we
should change our behavior immediately; but doing so is a matter of prudence, not of
morality.107
But an important difference exists between The Selfish Will Suffer and the case of
global climate change. That important difference is that prudence has a very clear role to
play in The Selfish Will Suffer. Its role is not nearly as clear in the case of global climate
change. The effects of global climate change are predicted to intensify over the course of
the 21st century, and many who are alive today will not be alive to experience the
projected more intense effects of climate change.108 However, many who are very young
today and have had relatively little impact on the climate through their personal behavior
will be alive to experience more of the intensified effects of global climate change. As
already discussed in chapter 1, many of the harms that contribute to global climate
change are individually negligible. The negative impact on an individual polluter of that
individual polluter’s behavior, moreover, is not nearly as clear for that individual as the
negative impact of selfish behavior would be for an individual in The Selfish Will Suffer
who is thinking about committing a selfish act. In The Selfish Will Suffer, it is beyond
question that people have an excellent and very general prudential reason to adhere to a
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very demanding altruistic moral code. In the actual world-case of global climate change,
however, it is less clear that people have a general prudential reason to avoid climate
change.
The upshot is that those generations (and perhaps in some cases, individuals) most
responsible for the current increase in average global temperatures, whoever they are,
will not directly suffer the negative consequences of their climate-affecting actions. The
negative consequences of those actions contributing to global climate change will most
heavily fall on young people alive today and on future generations. Avoiding global
climate change, in moral terms, would be a matter of prudence for current generations if
the negative consequences of pollution fell squarely on those responsible for polluting
acts. But that is not the case; it is not the case that carbon emissions from driving one’s
car are, for example, directly pumped into one’s own lungs and into no one else’s; there
is no system by which individual punishments for individual acts of pollution are given
out; and we have no independent confirmation that anything like punishment for
pollution exists in the hereafter. This means that whatever reasons exist for me to avoid
polluting acts where I can and reduce their impact where I cannot avoid them, they must
not be solely prudential reasons. I must have moral reasons to reduce my contribution to
climate change. So my case does, I think, show more than just that prudence alone might
turn out to be greatly demanding. I agree with the person who argues that prudence, in
some cases, will be extremely demanding. In those cases, it will perhaps not be a mark
against prudence that it is so demanding. But I think this thought experiment shows that,
whatever role prudence plays in our response to global climate change, it is not clear that
it plays the dominant role. Morality must, then, have something to say about our response
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to global climate change, because prudence alone has thus far proven insufficient to
address the problem.
Does the Collective Principle also generate the Polluter’s Dilemma? To see whether
this is so, let us run the same test that we ran in the previous two chapters against rule
consequentialism and theories containing an agent-centered prerogative. Let’s suppose
that we are in a world where there is a consequentially optimal level of pollution, such
that if there is more environmental regulation then scientific and economic activity will
be hampered, and such that if there is less environmental regulation, climate change will
accelerate beyond our ability to adapt to it. In such a situation, the Collective Principle
requires us to assume full compliance with a plan of action that is optimal in terms of
expected aggregate well-being from that point forward, taking into account the effects of
actual failures of beneficence in the past. It would thus appear that the Collective
Principle, if actually followed, would not generate the runaway result of the Polluter’s
Dilemma, as (for example) a consequentialist theory containing an agent-centered
prerogative would.
Here, then, is a way in which Murphy’s Collective Principle escapes the troubling
result that hobbled rule consequentialism and agent-centered prerogative-containing
theories: it is not directly collectively self-defeating. At least, it is not directly collectively
self-defeating in this situation. It may be just that in other situations. But the troubling
results we have uncovered so far are reason enough to reject the Collective Principle as
an acceptable solution to the Demandingness Objection. In the previous section of this
chapter, we learned that the Collective Principle regularly fails to make appropriate,
plausible demands of agents. This is so because the Collective Principle depends on a
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narrowly specified notion of fairness that is tailored to avoid the result in which those
agents who do not comply with the demands of beneficence exploit me. In this section,
we learned that there are circumstances in the actual world that would result in significant
demands upon an agent if she complied fully with the Collective Principle. Even if we
think that result is appropriate because it is necessary to avoid disaster, the Collective
Principle’s recommendations for low-cost-high-benefit cases seem notably inconsistent
with its extreme demandingness in the case where we are forced to respond to the
problem of global climate change.

4. The Modified Compliance Condition
To conclude this chapter, I want to consider whether we can use the fairness
considerations I pointed to earlier to construct a modified Compliance Condition that
would solve the problems the Compliance Condition has generated for Murphy. Let the
new Compliance Condition read as follows:
Modified Compliance Condition (MCC). If other agents cease to comply
with the demands of a principle of beneficence, an acceptable principle of
beneficence will not increase its demands on agents who do comply with
that principle unless agents who have already complied are either uniquely
situated to bring about beneficent effects or particularly efficient at
bringing beneficent effects about.
Let me now be explicit about what “uniquely situated” and “particularly efficient” mean.
If I am uniquely situated to bring about beneficent effects, I occupy a place of optimal
physical proximity and effective ability to the situation that no one else does, such that I
am the only one who could bring about the good to be done. If I am particularly efficient
at bringing about beneficent effects, my abilities or resources are such that a small
sacrifice on my part brings about a beneficent effect that greatly outweighs my sacrifice.
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Making this change to the Compliance Condition requires a modification of the
Collective Principle. The modification is italicized:
Modified Collective Principle (MCP). Everyone is required to perform one
of the actions that, of those available to her, is optimal in respect of
expected aggregate weighted well-being, except in situations of partial
compliance with this principle. In situations of partial compliance, a
person’s maximum level of required sacrifice is that which will reduce her
level of expected well-being to the level it would be, all other aspects of
her situation remaining the same, if there were to be full compliance from
that point on, unless that person is uniquely situated to bring about
beneficent effects or particularly efficient at bringing beneficent effects
about. Under partial compliance a person is required to perform either an
action that is optimal in respect of expected weighted aggregate wellbeing, or any other action which is at least as good in respect of expected
weighted aggregate well-being, if they are uniquely able to do so.
However, no one is required to act in a way that imposes a loss
on some other person unless that other persons’ expected level of wellbeing after the loss would be at least as high as it would be, all other
aspects of the situation remaining the same, under full compliance from
that point on.
I indicated that, in section 2 of this chapter, that such modifications would be desirable
because they would prevent absurd results such as an affluent person being permitted to
deny a starving homeless person twenty cents if that affluent person has already done
their fair share of bringing about beneficent effects. We also have an adequate rationale
for making such a modification. The original motivation for the Collective Principle was
the recognition that beneficence is a shared group project that needs to be fair in how it
parcels out its demands. MCC is not an ad hoc modification; it responds to the same
recognition that originally motivated the Compliance Condition, but differs in that it has a
more nuanced understanding of fairness.
The main problem with the Collective Principle, as I understand it, is not that it
generates Polluter’s Dilemmas. The central problem was its failure to make appropriate,
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plausible demands of agents who had already done their fair share. MCP is far less likely
to permit such failures.
Consider again Rachels’ two-rescuer case. Even if I have already complied with
the demands of morality by saving one of the two drowning children, MCP requires me
to wade in and save the second child if I am either uniquely positioned to do so or
particularly efficient at bringing about the saving of the second child. I am the only
bystander, and it would not be difficult for me to wade back in to the pond. I satisfy both
conditions, so MCP does not let me off the hook. I must wade in and save the second
child.
Let’s modify the two-rescuer case slightly so that wading back in involves a
danger to my health, where I am the rescuer. Suppose that the situation is the same as
before; two children are drowning in a body of water, and I and another person are on
hand to witness this. However, we are not faced with a pond. Instead, the two children are
drowning in a deep lake, and the lake, like everything else in the immediate vicinity, is in
the icy grip of winter. Perhaps because of this, the other potential rescuer walks away
without doing anything to save one of the drowning children. I, however, comply with
the demands of morality, and I plunge into the frigid waters to drag one of the children
out. I am in some danger of hypothermia; after all, my clothes are now wet with freezing
cold water. Does MCP tell me to wade back in to the water? That depends on how
reasonably able I am to bring about the saving of the second child’s life. If I am already
suffering horribly from the shock of the cold, then I am not required to wade back in. I
would not be uniquely situated to perform a beneficent action here, because I would not
be physically able to withstand another trip into the water. Nor would I be particularly
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efficient at bringing about the intended beneficent effects; it would not be a small
sacrifice on my part to wade back into the lake, because the sacrifice of making another
trip into the water might actually kill me, rather than effectively result in the saving of the
second child’s life and my continued survival. If I am able to withstand a second trip into
the water, however, then MCP may tell me to plunge back into the lake. That is because I
would still be uniquely situated to perform the beneficent action, even if I wasn’t
particularly efficient at performing the action. I am still the only other person around, and
I would be effectively able to pull the action off.
And what if I find myself in the situation of the affluent citizen who has to decide
whether to give a homeless person twenty cents? Again, the answer depends on whether I
am uniquely situated or particularly efficient with regard to my ability to bring about
beneficent effects. If there are bystanders who have not done their fair share and
sacrificing more would leave me unable to pay for my home, then I am not required to
give twenty cents. But if I am the only one around who can help, or if twenty cents would
not represent a significant burden to me, then MCP would require me to give twenty
cents to the homeless person.
These results seem to be consistent with common sense. MCP requires that we
contribute our fair share toward a shared beneficent goal in normal circumstances. That is
a feature shared with Murphy’s original Collective Principle. The new feature, however,
is that MCP requires that we take special care to evaluate whether we are uniquely able to
make a difference in a particular situation. MCP is still concerned with protecting us from
being exploited by people who do not do their fair share, but not obsessively so, and
particularly not at the expense of our common-sense intuition that, in many cases, a duty
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of rescue trumps considerations of fairness. So MCP is a little more demanding than
Murphy’s unmodified Collective Principle in this way, but it doesn’t appear excessively
demanding. It would be excessively demanding if it recommended that an affluent citizen
must give twenty cents to a homeless person in the situation where (1) that affluent
citizen has already done her fair share of donating to charity, (2) there are onlookers who
have not complied with morality by doing their fair share of donating to charity, and (3)
giving twenty cents would seriously damage the affluent citizen’s prospects and interests.
It seems, in that situation, that there would not be many limits to the demands that
morality would make. But MCP would not recommend that this affluent citizen give
twenty cents. It would, instead, require that the onlookers start doing their fair share.
The Collective Principle also faced the objection that it was unable to escape the
Demandingness Objection in the actual world. Recall, from section three, the result of
Mulgan’s Wrong Facts Objection. If the size of the good to be done is large enough, then
each individual’s fair share of the good to be done will be overwhelming. In responding
to the problem of climate change, the Collective Principle required us all to immediately
shift to full compliance with a system of environmentally friendly behavior, with drastic
consequences. The Collective Principle avoids generating the Polluter’s Dilemma, but
does not appear to avoid the Demandingness Objection. Does MCP do any better in this
regard?
In a situation of partial compliance, like the unmodified Collective Principle,
MCP requires us to come into full compliance with the demands of beneficence. It
assigns fair shares of the good to be done to each individual. So MCP requires some
sacrifice of most people. But there is some reason to think that MCP is less demanding in
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the case of global climate change than the unmodified Collective Principle. MCP requires
more sacrifice from people who are uniquely able to bring about beneficent effects. To be
sure, there is no one unique person who is in a position to perform all the beneficent acts
needed to solve the problem of global climate change. But there are many people who are
in a better position than others to ensure that beneficent effects are brought about;
politicians, policymakers, public intellectuals, thought leaders, important economic and
business leaders, and the like. Those individuals are more able to shape the way the
public perceives the threat of climate change, and more able to ensure that the changes
necessary to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change are brought about. MCP
requires them to do their fair share to mitigate the effects of climate change. But MCP
requires them to do more than they have been doing to help the rest of the population and
change. Perhaps, then, everyone else’s fair share will be more manageable.
I think MCP is a modification that Murphy could accept, because there is a solid
rationale for doing so and MCP retains Murphy’s sense of the importance of protecting
people who care about complying with morality from exploitation by those who do not. I
do not, myself, know whether MCP is true, and I don’t claim that it is true. But I do claim
that it is an improvement to the original Collective Principle, and that it is a better way of
avoiding the Demandingness Objection than the original Collective Principle was.
Remember that the original Collective Principle, even though it avoided the Polluter’s
Dilemma, was moderated so much that it regularly failed to make appropriate, plausible
demands. I argued that a deeper analysis of the notion of fairness could help the
Collective Principle out, and MCP is the result. There is some reason to think that MCP
avoids both of the objections that I raised against the unmodified Collective Principle. I
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conclude that if the Collective Principle is modified to reflect a more nuanced
understanding of the concept of fairness, it is a better response to the Demandingness
Objection than the previous alternatives we have surveyed.
In the next chapter, I wish to survey another version of consequentialism that also
represents a promising answer to the Demandingness Objection. It shares with MCP the
ability to avoid both the Demandingness Objection and the Polluter’s Dilemma, and it
does so without placing enormous burdens on those who care about morality. Once we
have considered that version of consequentialism, we shall be in an even better position
to see what features are desirable in an acceptable version of consequentialism.
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Chapter 4: Multiple-Act Consequentialism and Constraints on
Acceptable Forms of Consequentialism

1. Introduction
We have reviewed several prominent forms of consequentialism that have failed to
successfully avoid the Demandingness Objection. Three varieties -- Scheffler’s Hybrid
Theory, Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism, and Hooker’s rule consequentialism -fall victim to the Polluter’s dilemma. Murphy’s Collective Principle of Beneficence
avoids the Polluter’s Dilemma, yet in doing so generates an extremely demanding result.
None of these theories, then, are acceptable forms of consequentialism.
I must say more about why this is so. What I propose to do in this chapter is not
simply to review the results of the negative arguments of previous chapters, but to
propose a general analysis of why these forms of consequentialism go awry. Using the
results of that analysis, I shall propose and argue in favor of a proper constraint on any
acceptable form of consequentialism. But the task of this chapter is not merely to sum up
the negative account of this project. Once that task is finished, I shall analyze a new
version of consequentialism, called Multiple-Act Consequentialism, or MAC for short.109
I shall argue that MAC avoids both the Demandingness Objection and the Polluter’s
Dilemma, and thus represents one promising path for future research on consequentialist
moral theory to take.
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2. Consequentialism, Its Rivals, and Climate Change
I have been presuming, up to this point, that climate change counts as a moral
problem. It seems appropriate to defend that position here. Doing so will strengthen my
argumentative position when I later argue that failure to deal with climate change
adequately is a proper constraint on acceptable forms of consequentialism.
I start with a very general observation: pollution is everyone’s problem, but not
everyone agrees whether it is, properly conceived, a moral problem. The facts are striking
in their scope: human industrial and economic activity, beginning with the Industrial
Revolution and proceeding increasingly quickly as decades pass, is transforming Earth in
ways that have severely taxing implications for many contemporary humans, future
humans, and other species present and future. Depending on what they think the nature of
morality is, philosophers have not universally responded to the problem of climate
change as a moral issue.
For example, Christine Korsgaard, a prominent defender of Kantian ethics, holds
that “bringing something about” is a feature of consequentialist thought that “distorts our
thinking” about ethics.110 Utilitarians, she holds, are obsessed with the preservation of the
environment.111 According to Korsgaard and Kant, the domain in which morality may
rightly sanction us for doing something wrong is much narrower than the consequentialist
suggests.
It is tempting to take away the impression that Kantians do not have much to say
about environmental protection, at least directly. But Kantians have many resources to
draw on when considering how to be beneficent toward the least well off in society.
110
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Onora O’Neill has argued that Kantians do have a basis for beneficent action toward
those in famine conditions: by not aiding people bedeviled by famine, we fail to respect
their autonomy and treat them as ends in themselves.112 We actually work to lessen their
autonomy by refusing to provide them with food.
The same argument could be extended to the case of those suffering due to global
climate change. When we fail to pursue environmentally sound policies and instead
satisfy our trivial desires that involve pollution as a side effect, we are essentially treating
other human beings, especially those most vulnerable to climate change, as a mere means
to an end. Their raw materials and the capacity of their ecosystems on which they depend
to absorb the pollution we generate provide the means to our own idiosyncratic end. By
adopting policies that create refugees from climate change, whether they are citizens of
the Maldives escaping rising sea levels, Bangladeshi citizens fleeing destructive floods,
or low-income Americans whose inexpensive homes are devastated by severe
thunderstorms and tornadoes, we have done serious harm to the autonomy of those
refugees. If that is true, then a Kantian argument exists which implies that we should
examine our own attitude toward the permissibility of polluting activities far more closely
and harshly than we currently do, though it remains to be spelled out exactly what kind of
practical consequences this argument would have.
Kantianism, however, is in better shape than contractarianism and common-sense
ethical pluralism.113 Dale Jamieson has recently taken these two ethical theories to task
for their laxity on the issue of climate change and I largely agree with his assessments,
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though, as noted above, I am less negative about the prospects for Kantianism.114
Contractarianism, Jamieson argues, excludes many types of beings from moral
consideration who are not party to moral agreements being made, and yet we believe that
many of these types of beings are just the sort of beings who deserve consideration when
dealing with environmental problems -- future people, non-rational humans such as
infants and those suffering from dementia, and non-rational animals.115 Common-sense
pluralists are generally averse to consequentialism’s tendency toward revisionism, but a
moral theory which deals adequately with climate change’s dangers would be very
revisionist in scope.116
Consequentialism, because of its orientation toward the future and its insistence on
evaluating outcomes as the determining factor in what makes an action right or wrong,
seems ideally positioned to have an excellent response to the problem of climate change.
But things are not so simple. Perhaps it is the case that the paradigm case of
consequentialism, which is classical act utilitarianism, is not a plausible way of dealing
with our environmental problems. Indeed, it may have contributed to them.
Environmental philosophers are at least as skeptical toward consequentialism as they are
toward Kantianism and contractarianism.117
Indeed, consider the Polluter’s Dilemma applied to act utilitarianism. Suppose,
once again, that we are in a situation where we have reached a consequentially optimal
level of pollution. If we restrict pollution more tightly than we already do, we hamper
economic productivity; if we restrict pollution less, the runaway process of climate
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change gets going and we lose our ability to successfully adapt to it. Now suppose you
are a good act utilitarian trying to decide whether to drive yourself to the mall to go
shopping or to stay at home and be content with what you have. If you drive yourself to
the mall, you exceed the pollution limit and the Polluter’s Dilemma gets going. But as we
have seen, the harm of a single polluting act is extremely small; as a good utilitarian, I
may thus cynically drive myself to the mall, generating some utility for myself (and
perhaps for others, since I am now in a good mood and less apt to be a sourpuss toward
everyone else) while contributing to the biggest collective action problem in human
history. Classical act utilitarianism thus looks doubly bad. Not only does it fail to avoid
the Demandingness Objection, but also it fails to avoid the Polluter’s Dilemma. Jamieson
concurs:
But when it comes to large-scale collective action problems, calculation invites
cynicism…because it appears that both morality and self-interest demand that ‘I
get mine’, since whatever others do, it appears that both the world and I are better
off if I fail to cooperate. Indeed, it is even possible that in some circumstances the
best outcome would be one in which I cause you to cooperate and me to defect.
Joyriding in my ‘57 Chevy will not in itself change the climate, nor will my
refraining from driving stabilize the climate…Since everyone, both individuals and
nations, can reason in this way, it appears that calculation leads to a downward
spiral of non-cooperation.118

3. The Polluter’s Dilemma as a Constraint on Acceptable Forms of
Consequentialism
Consequentialists have been historically most interested in avoiding the
Demandingness Objection. Perhaps this is unnecessary; after all, there is some precedent
suggesting that standard objections to most moral theories are question begging in subtle
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ways.119 But consequentialists cannot afford to be lax in combating the Polluter’s
Dilemma. Failing to recommend widespread revisions in the way we ordinarily behave,
and thereby failing to resolve the problem of global climate change, would demonstrate
the complete inadequacy of consequentialism as a plausible ethical system. This is
because consequentialism would be shown to suffer from a deep incoherency. Here is the
incoherency: consequentialism is fundamentally about producing the best state of affairs
possible for the greatest number, impartially judged; but if consequentialism fails to solve
the Polluter’s Dilemma, then consequentialism will be, in essence, telling us to produce
the best state of affairs possible, and to do so in a way that will fail to produce the best
state of affairs possible. Consequentialism, then, would be self-refuting -- proven false on
its own terms.
The objection that a theory is self-refuting is, of course, not a new kind of
objection.120 The most influential modern treatment of this topic is Derek Parfit’s
treatment of directly collectively self-defeating moral theories in chapter 2 of Reasons
and Persons.
According to Parfit, the “T-given aims” of a moral theory T are the goals that a
moral theory tells us to seek. And we “successfully follow T” whenever we manage to do
that act which best accomplishes the T-given aims of our moral theory. With that
terminology in hand, Parfit proposes the following disjunctive definition of direct
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collective self-defeat. A moral theory T that gives the same goals to every agent is
directly collectively self-defeating when
1) It is certain that, if we all successfully follow T, we will thereby cause our Tgiven aims to be worse achieved than if none of us had successfully followed T; or
2) our acts will cause our T-given aims to be best achieved only if we do not
successfully follow T.121

Parfit is motivated to make this a proper constraint on acceptable theories of
morality because most philosophers accept that morality is ultimately a collective project
that requires the possibility of success at the collective level.122 And although Parfit does
not at length defend this motivation, it is a fairly plausible thesis which other authors are
concerned to defend. As an example, Alan Gibbard has pursued a similar thesis in a
recent series of Tanner Lectures by arguing that planning how to live together on terms
that no one could reasonably reject requires us to have some kind of method by which we
balance out competing projects. Thus, a consistent theory of how to live together would
have to be, in a crucial sense, consequentialist.123
There is some disagreement over whether being directly collectively self-defeating
should actually be a proper constraint on moral theories. Joseph Mendola has objected to
this proposal, arguing that any plausible moral theory would violate the constraint given
the correct circumstances.124 Circumstances might be such that, if we were to all
successfully act on our dearly held consequentialist moral theory, some disastrous event
would befall everyone. Mendola’s thought experiment involves an extraterrestrial attack
on a community of consequentialist humans. Whenever the humans successfully follow
121
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their theory by seeking to promote the impartial good of all, the extraterrestrials inflict
grievous harm on everyone. It is only by abandoning consequentialism that the
extraterrestrials are placated. In this case, consequentialism would be directly collectively
self-defeating, as would a variety of other moral theories that counted beneficence as
important. The troubling upshot, then, is that a wide swath of morality is completely
ruled out by the constraint on self-defeat. So Mendola would perhaps recommend that I
cease wielding the self-defeat constraint as a weapon against other normative theories,
because using the self-defeat constraint is a kind of philosophical Mutually Assured
Destruction.
Mendola considers and responds to many possible objections to his argument. One
of those possible responses is that his case is not only fictional, but too implausible to
take seriously for the purposes of moral theorizing. Mendola rejects this rebuttal. He
makes two points in response.
The first point is that the case is plausible, despite its initial reliance on stringently
deontological extraterrestrials. It is possible, he claims, that we could develop the
requisite technologies that would enable us to make life miserable for a specified group
of humans who behave in consequentialist ways.125 Given some basic knowledge about
the extent of spying capabilities of intelligence agencies, it is hard to dispute this point.
Mendola’s second point is to insist that saying his case is “irrelevant because
implausible is to insist that moral theories are contingently true or false.”126 Maybe
consequentialism is true right now, in the actual world, but if the deontological
extraterrestrials descend from the sky, consequentialism will suddenly become false.
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Indeed, this is just what Mendola claims: consequentialism will be false if the evil
extraterrestrials exist.127 Surely, he thinks, the truth of moral theories cannot vary when
contingent facts of the situation change.
What is it for a moral theory to be false? One way a moral theory can be false is to
be take arbitrary facts into account. In relevantly similar situations, with all morally
relevant facts staying the same, a moral theory might be false if it told us to do different
things based on some morally irrelevant fact like the color of a person’s skin. Here is a
novel form of consequentialism, which I shall call orange socks on alternate Wednesdays
act utilitarianism. Combine a hedonic theory of value with the classical act
consequentialist theory of right action, but jettison the classical utilitarian emphasis on
strict impartiality. Instead, stipulate that the people whose utility are to be maximized are
those people who consistently wear orange socks on alternate Wednesdays. This theory is
false because there is no morally significant justification for promoting the value of such
people.
A second way that a theory could be false because it is internally inconsistent, such
as when it affirms both of the following statements:
(1) “All forms of life are infinitely morally valuable and a moral person ought to
never harm any form of life.”
(2) “It is morally permissible to clean my shower with a bleach-containing agent.”
Obviously, if I use bleach in my shower, I kill many microorganisms living in my shower
drain. I would have to believe that doing so is morally permissible to carry out my act.
But that belief is inconsistent with the first statement. This moral theory is false.
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A third way for justifiably concluding that a theory is false is for that theory to
produce wildly counterintuitive results, either on a very crucial point on which most
reasonable people are agreed, or to consistently produce counter-intuitive results on a
wide variety of issues. Classical act utilitarianism has been thought by many to be false
because there are situations in which classical act utilitarianism recommends that we
violate someone’s rights in order to maximize utility. This is, of course, a less reliable
method of showing a moral theory to be false. An act utilitarian might bite the bullet and
argue that the theory is correct, regardless of what our intuitions tell us about a particular
case. But we might nevertheless justifiably conclude that the act utilitarian’s argument is
insufficient to save the moral theory from the objection.
Suppose that Mendola’s extraterrestrials do exist. Is consequentialism false? More
precisely, is consequentialism false in this case because it commits one of the errors just
listed? So far as we can tell, consequentialists are not focusing on morally irrelevant
details, nor are they behaving in obviously counterintuitive ways. Moreover,
consequentialism is not obviously internally inconsistent. It isn’t affirming two mutually
incompatible theses.
What Mendola has shown is that we might say that consequentialism is being
shown to be a theory that cannot be successfully followed. It recommends that we follow
a course of action that should in theory lead to great benefit but in practice leads to
horrible suffering. If Prisoner’s Dilemmas are as common as Mendola thinks, then his
extraterrestrials case is the merely the tip of the spear.
I accept the contention that being directly collectively self-defeating shows that a
moral theory is false. However, Mendola’s results are limited. He has only shown that
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one version of consequentialism is false. There may be others that are not directly
collectively self-defeating. The extraterrestrials in his case stipulate that they will do their
worst only if the consequentialist humans universally and successfully follow their moral
theory. But if our consequentialist theory is versatile enough to tell most people to
continue maximizing the good and to simultaneously permit a defection from the theory
such that at least one person becomes and behaves as a non-consequentialist, then that
theory will avoid being directly-collectively self-defeating. Collectively, we will have
acted so as to achieve the goal of the theory (i.e., to maximize the good), but we will not
have universally followed the theory. I think this is defensible as being compatible with
consequentialism because it is far more important to a consequentialist that an act satisfy
the consequentialist standard of rightness than it is to have an action carried out according
to a formal procedure from which no act may be allowed to deviate. Such a constraint is
not properly part of consequentialism, because it has no consistent consequentialist
rationale. It may be right for a consequentialist to tell someone else that he should not
behave as a consequentialist, if not behaving as a consequentialist has better
consequences than not behaving as a consequentialist.
Another reason exists for me to not give up the line of attack that relies upon direct
collective self-defeat. The problem of global climate change is a special problem for
consequentialism, and the test of the Polluter’s Dilemma can tell us whether
consequentialism is even worthy of consideration, on its own terms. Consider the
revisionist nature of consequentialism, alluded to in chapter 1. Consequentialism’s (or
rather, utilitarianism’s) future orientation, impartiality, and dogged insistence on
examining the actual effects of moral decision-making on the lives of the members of the
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moral community has historically made it a moral theory especially well-suited for
proposing intuitively much-needed change. Thus, the use of the self-defeat argument
could be read less as an insistence on a formal rational constraint, and instead as a test of
whether consequentialism can solve its problems and live up to its promise. If
consequentialism cannot answer the test of the Polluter’s Dilemma, then traditional
ethical theory would be deprived of the most straightforward explanation possible as to
why global climate change is a colossal moral problem: because it imposes widespread,
temporally-extended, and dramatic suffering on the widest possible variety of Earthly
creatures. That explanation is practically valuable to our moral thinking.
I am thus not worried about the Polluter’s Dilemma on the ground of formal
rationality. Consistency is important, but the worry I am pressing is not the insistence,
rooted in that ground of formal rationality, that consequentialism should not demand its
own abandonment. Taking that worry seriously would be to have decamped for nonconsequentialist territory already. Rather, the insistence on consequentialism being able
to avoid self-defeat is in pursuit of the goal of shoring up consequentialism against one of
the traditional complaints people make against it; that consequentialism is too permissive
in certain perverse ways and thereby permits me to cause grievous harm in pursuit of
overall maximization of the good. This worry is especially pressing in the case of climate
change. If a concern for maximizing the good leads directly to catastrophic results, then it
isn’t the case that the theory is recommending its own abandonment. Rather, we are
demonstrating the theory to be completely inadequate to achieve the very goal we hope it
accomplishes.
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It’s worth asking at this point just how other versions of consequentialism have
proven themselves to be completely inadequate. I think the answer has something to do
with how consequentialists have responded to the Demandingness Objection’s insistence
on space for the personal point of view. Recall that Bernard Williams’s excellent
statement of the Demandingness Objection involved an explicit appeal to the need to
defend the integrity of a person:
[A person] is identified with his actions as flowing from projects and attitudes
which in some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is
about….It is absurd to demand…that he should just step aside…and acknowledge
the decision which utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienate him in a real
sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own convictions….It is
thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity.128

This, combined with Rawls’s insistence that utilitarianism, due to its aggregative
nature, does not respect the difference between persons, has left consequentialists
understandably anxious to demonstrate that their theory avoids this flaw. But two theories
that I examined in a previous chapter have committed the mistake of combining too much
room for the personal point of view with the contingent fact that some harms are such
that they are imperceptibly tiny, yet of an aggregative nature. In chapter 1, I considered
two forms of consequentialism that shared an Agent-Centered Prerogative. I rejected
them on the grounds that the Agent-Centered Prerogative grants far too much weight to
the personal point of view, thus allowing for the possibility that individual idiosyncrasies
would easily be able to trump the small harms generated by polluting acts. So that version
of consequentialism fails, and it does so instructively. The lesson to learn from those two
theories’ failures is that too much space for the personal point of view is
counterproductive. And yet, it is hard to deny that integrity is important. So, a better form
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of consequentialism would grant some integrity to persons without allowing them room
to defect from cooperative acts due to their desires to pursue their own projects,
regardless of what those projects are.
In chapter 2, I considered how Brad Hooker’s form of rule consequentialism hews
close to common-sense morality. It hews so closely to common-sense morality that, in
fact, it would either not recommend adoption of a “prevent disaster” rule that would
prevent the generation of Polluter’s Dilemmas because Hooker wishes to respect our
intuitive notions about how hard a moral theory should be to follow, or it would adopt the
“prevent disaster” rule and endorse an extremely demanding result. But I showed that
Hooker’s view rests on unstable notions of what would count as too demanding for
hypothetical people. The instability of such intuitions is enough to reject Hooker’s rule
consequentialism. So a better form of consequentialism would not rest on appeals to
counterfactual situations, or what some suitably idealized actors would tell us to do.
And in chapter 3, we saw how Liam Murphy’s Collective Principle of Beneficence
is problematic. This is due to its reliance on facts about what my fair share would be in a
situation where everyone was complying with the demands of morality. Murphy’s
thought seems to be that I am not allowed to get away with not doing anything
beneficent, but there will come a point at which, despite whatever demands of morality
that remain, I will be permitted to stand aside and cease cooperating. The unique flaw of
Murphy’s view is that it is apparently insensitive to the kinds of beneficent demands
being made. We can perhaps make sense of a fair share in the case of famine relief. But
other kinds of beneficence -- for example, taking action to avoid climate change -- do not
seem to admit of a stopping point. Murphy’s view also shares with Hooker’s view the
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insistence on making the criteria of right action dependent upon what obtains in
counterfactual situations, and such an insistence causes problems for Murphy just as it
does for Hooker. A better version of consequentialism, finally, would be sensitive to the
kinds of beneficent demands being made.
Ideally, our hypothetical better version of consequentialism would be able to deploy
very general theoretical mechanisms in order to accomplish these tasks. The agentcentered prerogative, for instance, is introduced seemingly for the sole purpose of
defending an agent’s personal point of view. But its specialized nature makes it the
perfect belt loop with which to catch oneself on the outstretched hook of a
counterexample. Such counterexamples would not work against more generalized
theoretical machinery. There is at least one version of this kind of theoretical machinery
available to consider, and we would do well to consider it here.

4. Mendola’s Multiple-Act Consequentialism
In previous chapters, I considered and rejected three moderate versions of
consequentialism. In this chapter, I considered and rejected classical act utilitarianism as
equally inadequate. But none of these are the best version of consequentialism. Perhaps
we don’t know what that version of consequentialism is. We know a little bit about what
it looks like. And if we went about trying to build it, we would know where to start. A
version of consequentialism exists which seems to satisfy the list of desiderata from the
last section of this chapter, and that is Multiple-Act Consequentialism. MAC is a recently
proposed novel version of consequentialism that is designed to avoid both the familiar
objections to standard act-consequentialism and the unstable consequentialist rationale of
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indirect forms of consequentialism.129 In the following sections, my goal is to make out
of MAC a case study in how consequentialism may avoid both the Demandingness
Objection and the Polluter’s Dilemma.
MAC is a variety of classical act utilitarianism which retains two crucial
components of that theory: (1) its insistence on direct consequentialist analysis of the
rightness or wrongness of acts, and (2) its injunction that maximization of the good
determines what is morally right and wrong. But MAC departs from classical act
utilitarianism in a number of interesting ways. The most interesting of these departures,
which, I believe is the central reason why MAC avoids the Polluter’s Dilemma, is
Mendola’s account of the metaphysics of group action.
A central reason why many philosophers have objected to act utilitarianism is this:
act utilitarianism appears to insist that we must directly and thoroughly evaluate the
consequences of each individual act we propose to perform in order to determine whether
that act is morally obligatory or forbidden,130 and a variety of ways exist in which our
calculations may lead us astray. In practice, it is unlikely that such a calculative effort
would be successful, for it requires that we first arm ourselves with a relatively precise
quantitative account of the values of pleasure and pain. Such an account is difficult to
produce. Aside from this, as Peter Railton has pointed out, the direct evaluation of an
129
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individual act’s consequences is subject to a regress.131 Before I decide what to do in a
given situation, I must decide on the optimal time to take in making my decision. But I
might have to decide how much time is optimal to allocate to deciding how much time to
allocate for making my decision. And so on.
Familiar to us by now, act utilitarianism will often recommend that we sacrifice our
time and resources for the general welfare, leaving us unable to pursue our own projects,
because much of our own income is spent in trivial ways that are not nearly as efficient at
generating maximal impersonal utility as a charitable donation to someone in desperate
need would be.132
Finally, classical utilitarianism is insensitive to the way in which overall utility is
distributed. It only enjoins us to generate as much utility as possible; it does not require
that we distribute it in any particular way.
Philosophers have responded to this problem in different ways. Derek Parfit, for
example, demonstrated that classical utilitarianism generates the recommendation that we
ought to favor the creation of a nightmarish maximally-populated world in which people
live lives that are on balance only barely worth living, if that is, in fact, what would
generate maximal utility, and Parfit argues that it is highly likely that any theory which
accepts a requirement to maximize value without any concern for how it is distributed
generates this nightmare world. This recommendation Parfit refers to as the Repugnant
Conclusion.133 John Rawls developed his explicitly non-consequentialist theory of justice
in response to this problem of classical utilitarianism, claiming that a proper
understanding of justice needs to respect the difference between persons, and part of
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respecting this difference is to combine the desire to maximize value with prioritizing the
well-being of the least-well off people in society.134
A crucial insight of MAC is that many of the ills of classical utilitarianism are
traceable to its conception of acts as standalone choices about what maximally promotes
the good. According to MAC, this conception of acts is incomplete. One of MAC’s key
principles is the thesis that group actions and group agency exist, both within a human
life and across different human lives.135 And furthermore, Mendola argues, there is often
no fact of the matter that any single action we perform is only part of one group action,
rather than being a part of one or more group actions. Thus, group actions may overlap in
one single momentary action. As an example of the kind of group action that exists
within a human life, consider any action that cannot be done in the space of a moment;
for example, the action of writing a research paper. Such an action - or, perhaps, it is
better to call it a project - is something that can only effectively be done over time. It will
require the cooperation of yourself today, such as when you go to the library to conduct a
literature search, with yourself tomorrow, when you begin reviewing the literature, and of
yourself at those times with yourself at a number of other further future points, when you
are engaged in the actual act of writing the paper.
Your literature review tomorrow, however, is not simply a part of the single group
act of writing the research paper. It may be a part of more than one group act within your
own life. If you hope to achieve tenure, then conducting a literature review for your soonto-be-written paper is not merely a part of your paper-writing project. It is part of the
larger group act that constitutes your earning tenure, which requires the cooperation of
134
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yourself today with yourself tomorrow, and the next day, and so forth -- until the tenure
committee gives you a favorable report, long after your research paper has been
published.
Things are more complicated still, however. For, if we stipulate that you are in a
stable, permanent relationship, your literature review tomorrow is not simply part of the
relatively small group act of writing the research paper, nor is it both part of writing the
paper and part of the larger group act of earning tenure. Your conducting a literature
review is, plausibly, part of the much larger group act involving both yourself and
another person at multiple times, whose overall group action is to succeed at building a
life together. Key to accomplishing this task is your gaining tenure. And key to gaining
tenure is writing a research paper. And key to writing a research paper is conducting a
literature review. When you conduct a literature review, there is very often no fact of the
matter about what single group act you are doing, according to MAC. Your single action
is often part of many group actions all at once, just as you, a single momentary agent, are
part of many group agents all at once. So not only do group actions exist, but also any
given action may be a part of a multiplicity of overlapping group acts.
A notion at work in the background here is Mendola’s position that group acts are
performed by group agents, which are in any case composed out of cooperating “atomic”
agents over time. Atomic agents, Mendola says, are the “basic cells” of the group agent,
whether the group agent is contained within and persists over a single life or the group
agent is comprised of cooperating atomic agents ranging over many separate lives.136 If
you are trying to earn tenure, then the multiplicity of individual moments of yourself over
the relevant timespan where you are working toward tenure is a group agent of the former
136
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sort. If you are trying to build a successful life with your spouse or partner, then you and
your partner jointly constitute a group agent of the latter sort.
Under what conditions do group agents exist? According to Mendola, a group agent
exists if and only if a collection of atomic agents take common action toward a goal they
share, when this action is rooted in shared true belief that a common goal exists, and
when there is a reason to continue pursuing this goal until the goal is either accomplished
or abandoned.137 The key point, Mendola stresses repeatedly, is that group agents must be
“literally try[ing]” to accomplish some shared goal over time, whether the group agent in
question persists over a single life or ranges over several lives.138 Two strangers merely
walking side-by-side do not, as Margaret Gilbert writes, constitute an act of going for a
walk together. There is a real difference between that situation and a different one in
which you and your partner both have the goal of going on a stroll and both believe that
you share this goal with each other. If you start speeding up in the former case, your
speeding up will occasion no criticism from the stranger walking beside you. But if you
start speeding up in the latter case, you may, rightly, come in for some criticism from
your partner for interfering with the work-in-progress of going on a walk together.139

5. Atomic Agency Within a Life?
The fact that group acts may overlap is the feature of this metaphysics of group
action that, I believe, allows Mendola to escape the Polluter’s Dilemma. But for a
moment, I want to return for a moment to an aspect of Mendola’s view that Elinor Mason
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has briefly criticized. This aspect is the proposal that group agency exists within a life.
Mason worries that Mendola’s conception of group agency runs aground on
considerations that favor Mason suggests that there is reason to favor the typical
conception of agency (on which an agent is just an ordinary human being directing its
life) over Mendola’s “overlapping” view of agency. The reason is that I can defect from
many entities that would be group agents in Mendola’s sense, but I cannot defect from, as
Mason writes, “the group agent that consists of the group of temporally distinct atomic
Elinors.”140 Mason’s point that I cannot defect from my own life is well-taken; I cannot
“opt out” of living my existence. Actually, I can, but that is on pain of ceasing my
existence. By contrast, I go on existing if I renounce all existing ties to partnerships or
institutions, mean existence though the result may be. But all the same, some questionbegging is taking place here. It is an unjustified assumption that I cannot defect from a
group project within my own life. To see this, consider: I am writing a dissertation now.
Three years ago, I was only working toward the writing of a dissertation. Were I to cease
writing a dissertation now, I would be defecting from a sincerely held goal shared by
many past time-slices of myself. Grant the gift of foresight to myself exactly three years
ago, and suppose for a moment that younger version of myself sees that I have grown
weary and decided to cease writing the dissertation. It is highly plausible that shock,
followed by righteous anger and withering criticism directed at me, would be my younger
self’s reaction. And rightly so: I would be defecting from a shared goal that has great
importance not only for myself now but also for myself at many previous (and future)
times. Hypothetical cases involving familiar science-fiction plot devices are always
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suspect, but this intuition is plausible enough. Mason’s suggestion does not carry as much
weight as it would first appear to.
Perhaps another reading of Mason’s worry might be appropriate. This second
reading runs as follows: I can defect from the ordinary kinds of group projects involving
partnerships and institutions, but I cannot defect from the group agent that ranges over
my own life because it is not the case that I am cooperating with past or future versions of
myself. That is because there is no one else that I am now cooperating with when I am
writing a dissertation. Only myself right now and the projects that I care about exist.
What Mendola identifies as “cooperation” between atomic agents within a life is better
thought of as a causal story about how I come to have the goals and plans for achieving
those goals, and the folk phenomenon of “making an agreement with oneself” -- for
example, to avoid eating ice cream excessively -- is not literally a mutual recognition that
there is a shared goal and a reason to continue cooperating. It is, rather, a simple matter of
placing a constraint on oneself about what constitutes acceptable behavior. But the
constraint is never something that multiple atomic agents are agreeing to; there is only
one agent, myself.
Mendola’s response is that the notion of group agency within a life is not really
controversial. Atomic agency within a life is meant to be an “analytic convenience,” not
reflective of any deep metaphysical underlying reality.141 All Mendola means to suggest,
it seems, is that we can recognize more or less discrete stages within a life by looking at
how the set of a given agent’s options is filled out.
Still, we can say more. I have a pretty good idea of what I will be like tomorrow,
because I cannot reasonably foresee any plausible scenario in which I lose my familiar
141
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desires for chocolate, having a dog, going on five-mile runs, and finishing my
dissertation. But I don’t know what I will be like in the distant future. Perhaps I will
become a couch potato who loves cats and has no desire to eat chocolate. But I am at
least weakly connected to my future self.142 It seems permissible to assume that long-term
projects like writing a dissertation and saving for retirement will be valuable to myselfplus-forty-years.
Let’s examine the example of saving for retirement in this context. When I make
the decision to save ten percent of my income for retirement, that decision has an
attendant hope, accompanied by the threat of self-criticism, that I will not become
profligate and change my savings plan such that I am saving almost nothing and spending
all my money in the present moment. So when I am trying to make decisions about how
best to benefit my distant future self, my thought process is more akin to working out
how best to cooperate with a different person removed in space from myself, and it is less
akin to placing a special constraint on myself now. If that is true, then the notion of an
atomic agent existing within a life seems to make perfectly good sense. Because this is
how my psychology operates, it also seems like the notion of an atomic agent within a
life is less an analytic convenience and more like an accurate reflection of my
psychology.
Of course, this could merely be a report about my own psychology, and thus not a
very strong argument. Maybe all I have established with any degree of reliability is that
atomic agency exists within my own life, but no one else’s. After all, it is not a very
strong inductive argument to reason from one’s own case to a general truth. But my case
is not special. We can make relatively good sense of many types of widespread
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phenomena, such as self-criticism for failing to live up to one’s own past judgments and
failure to achieve sincerely held goals because of momentary akrasia, with the
explanatory device of atomic agency within a life.

6. How Overlapping Group Agency Plausibly Solves the Polluter’s Dilemma
The main thread of this discussion, however, is to see how MAC avoids both the
Demandingness Objection and the Polluter’s Dilemma. And now, having done some
work to explicate and defend the notion of group agency within a life, we are in a
position to see how MAC avoids both obstacles.
As we have seen, there are a variety of mechanisms that consequentialist
philosophers have attempted to make use of. Mendola’s preferred mechanism is direct
consequentialist evaluation of overlapping group agency, which is sufficiently general
enough that it may actually be used to avoid both the Demandingness Objection and the
Polluter’s Dilemma. The crucial mechanism is this:
We should compare a first situation in which the atomic agent achieves what it can
by defection but in which the various other atomic agents that in fact constitute
group agent do not constitute such an agent, to a second situation in which the
group agent acts as it does and the atomic agent does not defect. If the first
situation is better, then MAC says to defect. If the second situation is better, MAC
says not to defect….one should defect from a group act with good consequences
only if one can achieve better consequences by the defecting act alone than the
entire group act achieves.143

Consider first how it avoids the Demandingness Objection. The first ingredient is
an acceptance of Williams’s objection; the integrity of the personal point of view must be
defended, and MAC appears to do this well. Mendola argues that MAC will directly
support the continued existence of our own moral agency through its recognition of a
143
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persisting group agent over time. This is because better consequences result from
allowing the various atomic agents of which I am composed to constitute an effective
group agent over time, as opposed to allowing individual time-slices of myself to defect
at will from overall projects with which I am supposed to cooperate. The worthwhile
projects are the difficult, long-term ones (e.g., writing a book, earning tenure), and
pulling those off would be better for me than any momentary option that might present
itself. But cooperation with myself over time requires being fair to my future selves; not
piling excessive demands upon them that they cannot handle seems part and parcel of
having respect for myself over time.144
It might be the case that, if I have excess time and effort not being devoted to some
beneficent group act, MAC would recommend that I join a beneficent group act.145
Perhaps MAC is more threatening to the integrity of the personal point of view than I
suggest here. I don’t believe this is a serious problem, however. It will be necessary for
my personal integrity to reserve the right to occasionally have some free time for my own
projects. Perhaps I don’t care about this; perhaps I am an altruistic workaholic who loves
nothing more than building houses 14 hours per day with Habitat for Humanity, and I
don’t perceive the work as a threat to my integrity because I identify so completely with
the view. In that case, I would not regard the work as demanding, and MAC would not
tell me to defect. But if I did regard that kind of work as extremely demanding, MAC
would underwrite the effort to avoid being fatigued by promoting good works. It would
do so by the afore-mentioned mechanism of promoting my sense of myself as an
effective agent over time. MAC might not allow me to similarly defect from an
144
145
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immediately pressing group act involving a catastrophe, such as saving as many lives as
possible from the wreckage in the wake of a severe outbreak of tornadoes. In that case,
the need to be beneficent is especially weighty, and complaining that I need some time
for myself seems especially inappropriate. But in ordinary circumstances, I will be
allowed time to pursue personal projects that enhance my own sense of effective agency
over time. So MAC strikes a balance between defending the personal point of view and
recommending beneficent acts. The same general mechanism by which MAC
recommends beneficent group acts, the mechanism of overlapping group agency, is the
same general mechanism by which it preserves us from the Demandingness Objection.
This mechanism furthermore governs our choices about the kinds of group actions
we join. MAC requires that we join group agents that have sufficiently good
consequences, stay inside beneficent group agents that we are already a part of, and
defect from group agents whose directly-evaluated actions are negative overall if we can
achieve some good that would not have otherwise been achieved by the negative group
act. For the first two sorts of group agents, Mendola claims that there is a weighty group
agent which holds that people ought to give at least 2.5% of their income to charity. This
group agent derives from traditions of beneficent alms giving rooted in several religious
traditions’ understanding of what obligation to the needy requires.146 For the latter sort of
group agent, consider a sort of situation in which you find yourself as an employee of a
company taking advantage of the desperately needy in a far-off land. You have access to
the secret archives that conclusively demonstrate the company’s wrongdoing. The value
of the company’s involvement in the far-off land is a net negative. You can defect and

146
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bring down the entire operation. MAC says to defect, as you can accomplish more good
with this action than the entire group agent put together.
And MAC easily deploys the very same machinery to avoid the Polluter’s
Dilemma, in the following ways.
First, there are various group agents that have as their goal the avoidance of the
catastrophe of climate change. If the group agents successfully act, then much good will
be the long-term result. Human beings will be able to sustainably enjoy a higher quality
of life for a much longer period of time, instead of rapidly depleting the earth’s resources
and ecosystems with the attendant deleterious effects on human health and society. There
are also various group acts that do not respect the goal of avoiding catastrophic climate
change. While these group acts will often generate a great deal of consequentially
weighty outcomes, alternative group acts that accomplish the same goal and that are
better with respect to the environment will often be available. To get this distinction in
clearer view, consider the group act of demanding, producing, and consuming paper
products such as facial tissue, toilet paper, paper towels, and sheets of paper for office
use. These group acts may be carried out with no heed paid to the sustainable forestry
practices of the paper products companies, or they may be carried out in a way that
promotes sustainable forestry. The second way of carrying out the group acts gets us
what we want, and preserves the environment for the long term. This results in better
consequences overall. MAC recommends that we join the second kind of group act.
Second, once inside a group act that is beneficent with regard to the environment
like the one just described above, MAC recommends that we not defect from it except in
extremely exceptional circumstances. We generally cannot generate as much good as the
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entire group act of non-pollution when we individually defect to pursue our own projects
that are non-optimal from the point of view of the environment and the beings dependent
upon it.
Third, if you are part of group acts whose actions are harmful to the environment
and you could achieve some good by defecting, you should defect from the harmful
group act.147 And the good consequences that could result from the successful pursuit of
the minimization of global climate change’s harsh effects are extremely weighty. There is
little good excuse, according to MAC, to defect from pursuing environmentally sound
action. MAC thus avoids the Polluter’s Dilemma.148
MAC, then, represents a real improvement over previous forms of
consequentialism. The theoretical machinery that sustains it is complicated, and it retains
several controversial features -- its insistence on direct evaluation of group acts, its
metaphysics of group agency, and its hedonistic value theory, for example. MAC may
prove to have faults. But it meets the constraint on self-defeat that I set out in previous
sections of this chapter, and it solves both the Demandingness Objection and the
Polluter’s Dilemma with the same piece of theoretical machinery. We have, then, at least
some reason to prefer MAC to rival forms of consequentialism.

147

This formulation reflects the version of MAC on offer in Mendola 2006. A forthcoming version of MAC
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